Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-118763
sigstore-js is a JavaScript library for Sigstore signing services. A malicious or compromised container registry can redirect an artifact upload to an attacker host, which then receives the registry's bearer token, Basic credentials or custom auth headers.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 17:26 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams that use sigstore-js to attach artifacts to container images in a registry, typically in build or signing pipelines. The exposure needs a registry that is malicious or compromised, since the registry supplies the upload location, so teams that never call attachArtifactToImage() or that only use trusted, self-controlled registries are at lower risk.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
sigstore or @sigstore/oci with npm ls @sigstore/oci sigstore and look for anything below 0.7.2.@sigstore/oci to find transitive copies.attachArtifactToImage() in your code or CI scripts.Unknown from the sources.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
sigstore-js provides JavaScript libraries for interacting with Sigstore services. Prior to 0.7.2, packages/oci/src/registry.ts contains a RegistryClient.signIn() method that stores registry Authorization and Docker configuration headers as defaults on a shared HTTP client, while RegistryClient.uploadBlob() sends a fresh PUT to an absolute blob-upload Location supplied by the registry without checking that its origin or scheme matches the registry. A malicious or compromised registry can therefore direct a user pushing an artifact through attachArtifactToImage() to an attacker-controlled host and receive the registry bearer token, Basic credentials, or custom authentication headers. Redirect-time header stripping does not prevent the leak because the cross-host PUT is a new explicit request rather than a followed redirect. This is a residual of CVE-2026-59891, whose fix changed credential selection in credentials.ts but did not constrain where credentials are sent from registry.ts. Version 0.7.2 fixes the issue by separating registry credentials from client-wide defaults and sending them only to the registry origin.
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