GITEA.DEV · CVE-2026-118535 · Package
FIX → 28.4.0
After a repository registered as an owner-scoped workflow source is transferred outside that owner, Gitea keeps trusting it. Its new owner can supply workflow code that runs with other repositories' Actions secrets and a write-capable GITEA_TOKEN.
first public Nov 15, 2026 · 2 sources
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Teams running self-hosted Gitea 1.27.0 through 28.3.0 that use owner-scoped Actions workflow sources. Exposure requires a registered source repository to leave the owning organization or user; instances without scoped workflow sources are not affected. Teams on other versions, or not using scoped workflow sources, can skip it.
Not affected if default-config, no-scoped-workflow-sources
Who cares gitea, github-actions, secrets, self-hosted
gitea --version and compare against the affected range >= 1.27.0, <= 28.3.0.Upgrade to 28.4.0
28.4.0.Gitea does not revoke an owner-scoped workflow source registration when the source repository is transferred outside that owner. Registration initially requires the source to belong to the organization or user, but later dispatch uses only its stable repository ID and does not revalidate ownership. The source's new owner can replace its workflow content. A subsequent event in another repository belonging to the original scope runs that attacker-controlled workflow with the consumer's plaintext Actions secrets and GITEA_TOKEN. On Gitea 28.1.0, this exposed a synthetic secret and produced a token that successfully wrote to a private consumer the attacker otherwise received HTTP 404 for.
ActionScopedWorkflowSource stores the consuming scope's OwnerID and the source's stable SourceRepoID. Owner-level enrollment only resolves repositories currently owned by that owner. Transfer changes the source owner but leaves this row intact, and dispatch loads the source by ID without checking its new owner.
This appears to be a missed lifecycle check rather than ordinary transfer behavior: repository deletion removes scoped-source rows, and transfer already removes the repository from the old owner's Actions AllowedCrossRepoIDs. A source transferred outside an organization also could not be freshly registered at that organization's owner scope. Nevertheless, the old trust silently remains and grants the new owner code execution in the original scope's consumer context.
Expected behavior: transferring a registered source outside the organization should revoke or suspend its owner-scoped trust and require explicit re-registration.
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Actual behavior: the registration survives, allowing the source's new owner to supply workflow code that runs with unrelated repositories' secrets and task token.
An attacker who gains ownership of a transferred scoped-workflow source can steal Actions secrets and use the GITEA_TOKEN to modify private repositories they cannot otherwise access. This can expose deployment credentials and compromise repositories across the source’s former organization.
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