Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-118505
ash_authentication is an Elixir authentication library for the Ash framework. Its brute-force limit setting did not apply to password, magic link and one-time password sign-in actions that a resource defines itself, so an unauthenticated attacker can guess passwords and codes without limit.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-11-03 16:21 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications built on ash_authentication 5.0.0-rc.4 up to but not including 5.0.0-rc.16 that use brute_force_strategy, especially where resources define their own password, magic link or OTP actions, or enable registration with OTP sign-in. Apps that do not use brute_force_strategy or that rely on the generated actions only are the most exposed; the sources do not say whether other configurations are safe.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
ash_authentication version in mix.lock or mix.exs; affected versions are from 5.0.0-rc.4 before 5.0.0-rc.16.brute_force_strategy and for hand-written sign-in, reset or OTP actions that do not carry the brute-force preparation.mix ash_authentication.install or , review the generated actions.add_strategy.otpash_authentication: upgrade to 5.0.0-rc.16 or later (affected range is 5.0.0-rc.4 before 5.0.0-rc.16).Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an unauthenticated attacker to guess passwords and one-time passwords without limit.
The password, magic link and OTP strategies enforce brute_force_strategy by adding a preparation only to the actions they generate. When the resource defines one of those actions itself, the strategy uses it as written and nothing checked that it carried the preparation, so the setting compiled and applied no limit. The generators produce exactly this: mix ash_authentication.install writes sign_in_with_password, request_password_reset_token and request_magic_link, mix ash_authentication.upgrade then adds brute_force_strategy to those strategies, and mix ash_authentication.add_strategy.otp writes its OTP actions without the preparation. Separately, with registration_enabled? true the OTP sign-in is a create action, which preparations do not run on, so brute_force_strategy {:preparation, module} never applied to it.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 5.0.0-rc.4 before 5.0.0-rc.16.
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