Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-117685
The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against a token's public-only restriction but checked the source blob only against the token owner's full permissions. A public-only token with write scope could mount a private package's blob, such as a container layer, into a public package, where anyone can download it.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-11-01 10:49 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams that host an OCI-compatible container registry with private and public package namespaces and issue public-only tokens with write:package scope to owners who can read private packages. The sources do not name the affected registry product or versions. Teams that do not run such a registry can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
Unknown from the sources.
No fix yet, per the sources.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The OCI registry's cross-repository blob mount checked the target package against the token's public-only restriction, but checked the source blob only against the full account permissions of the token owner. A public-only token with write:package scope, whose owner can read a private package and write to a public package namespace, could mount a blob of the private package into the public package. The private blob, such as a container layer, could then be downloaded by anyone through the public package.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-117685")
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