Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-117549
@fastify/secure-session, a Fastify session plugin, versions 7.5.0 through 8.4.1 decrypt a session even when its cookie signature fails validation when the signed cookie option is set. An attacker holding an old, unexpired session cookie can strip the invalid signature and keep using that session after the signing secret is rotated.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-11-02 11:22 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that use @fastify/secure-session with the signed cookie option and that rotate only the cookie signing secret to end existing sessions. The attacker needs an existing unexpired encrypted session cookie but no secret. Applications that do not set the signed cookie option, or that rotate the encryption key when they rotate sessions, are not exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
@fastify/secure-session in package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml or yarn.lock, or with npm ls @fastify/secure-session.signed cookie options set on the session plugin registration and whether the signing secret is rotated separately from the encryption key.@fastify/secure-session: upgrade to 8.4.2Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
@fastify/secure-session is a session plugin for Fastify that stores an encrypted session in a cookie. In versions 7.5.0 through 8.4.1, when the plugin is configured with the signed cookie option, it calls the cookie unsign routine but, when the signature check reports the value as invalid, still passes the original cookie value to the session decoder, so a session whose signature did not validate is decrypted anyway. The practical effect appears when an application supplies the cookie signing secret independently of the session encryption key and rotates only the signing secret to retire existing sessions while keeping the encryption key active, because a holder of an old session cookie can strip the now obsolete signature and keep using the session. The attacker must already possess an unexpired encrypted session cookie and needs neither secret, and cannot forge session data, extend expiry, or survive rotation of the encryption key. The issue is fixed in @fastify/secure-session 8.4.2, which no longer decodes the session when the signed cookie option is set and the signature check fails, and users should upgrade to 8.4.2 or later. As a workaround, rotate the session encryption key rather than relying on rotation of the cookie signing secret alone.
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