---
id: "CVE-2026-116617"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-116617"]
title: "WordPress Motors plugin: subscribers can delete other users' uploaded images"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.1
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["motors-plugin", "package", "wordpress", "wordpress-plugin"]
not_affected_if: ["newer-version", "plugin-not-installed", "registration-closed"]
published_at: "2026-11-05T05:18:19+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-05T05:31:54+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-05T05:33:39+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116617", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-05T05:31:54+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# WordPress Motors plugin: subscribers can delete other users' uploaded images

The Motors car dealership plugin for WordPress lets a logged-in subscriber store a crafted file path in their profile and then delete image files under wp-content/uploads that belong to other users, including avatars and dealer logos. Files outside the uploads directory, such as wp-config.php, cannot be reached according to the description.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed version of the Motors plugin in the WordPress admin plugins list; versions up to and including `1.4.128` are affected.
- Look for the `stm_save_user_extra_fields` function and the `stm_dealer_logo_path` user meta key in the plugin code.
- Confirm whether user registration lets new accounts sign up as Subscriber.

## Fix

- Move the Motors plugin to a version later than `1.4.128`; the sources do not name the fixed version.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-05T05:31:54+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116617

## From the sources

The Motors – Car Dealership & Classified Listings Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.128 The vulnerability exists because `stm_save_user_extra_fields()`, hooked to `personal_options_update`, writes the attacker-controlled `stm_dealer_logo_path` parameter directly to user meta without an ownership check binding the submitted path to the submitting user — unlike the `stm_payment_status` and `stm_lost_password_hash` fields, this field is not gated by a `manage_options` or `edit_users` capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete image files belonging to other users under `wp-content/uploads` — including other users' avatars, dealer logos, and uploaded media — by storing a crafted path via their own profile and then triggering `unlink()` through the become-dealer form on their author page. Note that the two path guards (`stm_mvl_is_path_within_uploads` and `stm_mvl_is_allowed_image_file`) do restrict the attack surface to files with an image extension that resolve within the uploads basedir; files outside that directory, such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files, cannot be reached.

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