---
id: "CVE-2026-116134"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-116134"]
title: "Perl HTTP::Body: unbounded multipart headers let one request exhaust memory"
severity: "high"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["catalyst", "http-body", "package", "perl", "plack", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["no-multipart-uploads", "request-size-capped-at-proxy"]
published_at: "2026-10-28T18:17:12+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-28T18:34:33+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-28T18:35:34+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116134", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-28T18:34:33+00:00"}]
---

# Perl HTTP::Body: unbounded multipart headers let one request exhaust memory

HTTP::Body, a Perl module that parses HTTP request bodies, reads every line of a multipart part's header block with no size limit, storing each in memory. A remote attacker can send one crafted request that exhausts the worker's memory and crashes or stalls it.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Run `cpanm --info HTTP::Body` or `perl -MHTTP::Body -e 'print $HTTP::Body::VERSION'` to read the installed version
- Search lockfiles and `cpanfile.snapshot` for `HTTP::Body`
- Check whether the app parses multipart uploads through HTTP::Body (for example via Catalyst or Plack request handling)

## Fix

- Upgrade HTTP::Body to `1.23_01` or later
- Until upgraded, limit request body and header size at the reverse proxy or server

## Timeline

- 2026-10-28T18:34:33+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116134

## From the sources

HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via an unbounded multipart part header block.

The multipart parser takes everything up to the first blank line after a boundary as the part's header block, with no limit on its size or number of lines. Every line is stored in the part's header hash, so a block of short lines costs about 60 bytes of memory per input byte.

A remote attacker can exhaust worker memory with a single request.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_
