Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-116131
Go to dashboardHTTP::Body, a Perl module that parses HTTP request bodies, has no limit on how many form fields or multipart parts a request can carry. A remote attacker can send one oversized body to exhaust worker memory or flood the disk with temporary files.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 18:34 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Perl applications that parse incoming request bodies through HTTP::Body, which includes many web frameworks and servers built on Catalyst or Plack, are exposed when they accept form posts or multipart uploads from untrusted clients. Services that do not accept request bodies from the internet, or that enforce body size and part count limits at a proxy in front, are less exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
perl -MHTTP::Body -e 'print $HTTP::Body::VERSION'cpanm --info HTTP::Body or by searching the dependency tree of your Perl app1.23_01 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl allow memory and temporary file exhaustion via an unlimited number of form fields and multipart parts.
The urlencoded parser splits the whole body on its separators at once, creating one scalar per separator before any field is stored. This costs about 90 bytes of memory per separator byte. The multipart parser creates a temporary file for every part that carries a filename. Neither parser limits how many fields or parts a body may hold.
A remote attacker can exhaust worker memory with a body made of separators, or create thousands of temporary files with one request of small file parts.
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