Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-115825
Go to dashboardHTTP::Server::PSGI reads request bodies with buffers sized by the declared Content-Length before any data arrives. A single request declaring a large length makes Perl run out of memory and exit, taking the server down until restarted.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-25 17:42 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Any Perl application that serves HTTP through HTTP::Server::PSGI, since it runs as a single process and any client that can reach the port can send the request. Deployments behind a proxy that already limits body size are less exposed, but the sources do not say which proxy settings are sufficient. Teams that do not use HTTP::Server::PSGI can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
cpanm --info HTTP::Server::PSGI or perl -MHTTP::Server::PSGI -e 'print $HTTP::Server::PSGI::VERSION' to read the installed versionHTTP::Server::PSGI version1.0056 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
HTTP::Server::PSGI versions before 1.0056 for Perl allow a single request to crash the server by declaring a large Content-Length.
The request body is read with sysread() calls sized by the remaining Content-Length. Perl grows the read buffer to the requested length before any data arrives, so the server tries to allocate as much memory as the client declares.
A remote attacker can send one request with a large Content-Length and a few body bytes, and perl exits with an out-of-memory error before the application is called. HTTP::Server::PSGI runs as a single process, so the server stays down until restarted.
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