Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-115774
Go to dashboardTwisted's IMAP4 server freezes its single-threaded process when a logged-in client sends a SEARCH with a negative literal size such as {-100}. An attacker with any valid mail account can stop every service in that process with one short command.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 20:59 UTC, 1h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|
| Twisted | pypi | <= 26.4.0 | 26.10.0rc1 |
pip show Twisted and check whether the version is 26.4.0 or earlierEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
An infinite-loop vulnerability (CWE-835) in the Twisted IMAP4 server lets an authenticated client freeze the whole process with one small command. twisted.mail.imap4.parseNestedParens reads an IMAP literal size with int() and never rejects a negative value. A negative size such as {-100} drives the parser cursor negative, and because a negative Python index wraps around the end of the string instead of raising, the scanning loop never terminates. It runs synchronously on the single-threaded reactor, so one SEARCH command holds the reactor at full CPU forever and every other connection stops being served.
Meeting an inline literal, parseNestedParens reads the size between the braces and advances the cursor past the body:
# twisted/mail/imap4.py parseNestedParens
literalSize = int(s[i + 1 : end]) # no sign check
contentStack[-1].append((s[end + 3 : end + 3 + literalSize],))
i = end + 3 + literalSize # negative size -> i goes negative
int(b"-100") is -100, so i goes negative; the loop condition i < len(s) stays true and s[i : i + 1] on a negative index never raises, so the cursor cycles forever. The _literalStringLimit guard only covers the synchronizing-literal continuation path, not this inline branch. The call is reached from select_SEARCH through arg_searchkeys, dispatched only in the selected state, so a valid login and a selected mailbox (any low-privilege account) suffice. It runs in the reactor thread, and the connection timeout cannot fire because the reactor itself is frozen.
Affected product: Twisted (twisted.mail), the IMAP4 server twisted.mail.imap4.IMAP4Server
Affected versions: 26.4.0 and earlier
Log in, select a mailbox, and send a SEARCH whose literal size is negative:
C: t1 LOGIN testuser password-test
C: t2 SELECT INBOX
C: t3 SEARCH {-100}zzzzzzzzzz
The server never responds and one core stays at 100 percent. In a measured run a health service co-hosted on the same reactor stopped answering the instant the command arrived, showing the freeze hits the whole process and not just the attacking connection. A valid {5}zzzzz completes normally and a non-numeric {abc} is rejected with a parse error, which isolates the cause to the missing negative-size check.
A remote denial of service. One command of about ten bytes freezes the single-threaded reactor, so it stops serving not only every other IMAP connection but every other service co-hosted in the same process (for example SMTP and POP3 under twistd mail), and no timeout can recover it until the process is restarted. It requires an authenticated session, so any account holder can trigger it; there is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution.
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