---
id: "CVE-2026-115364"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-115364"]
title: "OpenBao: missing auth check lets attackers stop Agent and Proxy services"
severity: "low"
cvss: 2.2
epss: 0.00258
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["infrastructure", "openbao", "secrets-management", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["no-agent-or-proxy", "require-request-header-disabled", "version-2.6.3-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-22T19:17:42+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T04:49:55+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115364", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-115364", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00"}]
---

# OpenBao: missing auth check lets attackers stop Agent and Proxy services

OpenBao before 2.6.3 does not check authorization on the Agent and Proxy quit endpoints when the X-Vault-Header is omitted. An attacker can send requests via server-side request forgery to /agent/v1/quit or /proxy/v1/quit and shut those services down.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the OpenBao version with `bao version`; versions below `2.6.3` are affected
- Check whether `require_request_header` is enabled in the Agent or Proxy configuration
- unknown whether the sources give a configuration file path or a service name for the check

## Fix

- Upgrade OpenBao to `2.6.3` or later
- unknown whether a configuration workaround exists before the upgrade

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115364
- 2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-115364

## From the sources

OpenBao before 2.6.3 contains a missing authorization check that allows attackers to stop Agent and Proxy services by omitting the X-Vault-Header. When require_request_header is enabled, attackers can send requests via server-side request forgery to /agent/v1/quit or /proxy/v1/quit to shut down these services.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_