---
id: "CVE-2026-114611"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-114611"]
title: "OCO-Server: unauthenticated forged MDM enrollment steals device identity certificates"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.1
epss: 0.00229
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "other"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["apple", "mdm", "oco-server", "other", "package", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["version-1.2.3-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-22T18:17:28+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114611", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00"}, {"source": "epss", "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-114611", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00"}]
---

# OCO-Server: unauthenticated forged MDM enrollment steals device identity certificates

OCO-Server, a self-hosted endpoint and Apple MDM management app, accepts enrollment plists signed with any self-made certificate because signer trust is never checked. An attacker who knows a registered device's serial number gets that device's MDM identity certificate and private key, can impersonate it, and can overwrite its database record with their own UDID.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

Check the installed OCO-Server version; versions before 1.2.3 are affected.

## Fix

Upgrade OCO-Server to version 1.2.3 or later.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:31+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114611
- 2026-10-24T07:15:51+00:00 epss https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-114611

## From the sources

OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_