{"id":"CVE-2026-114077","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-114077"],"related":[],"title":"Trigger.dev: deployment lookup by ID lets one environment hijack another's deployment","description":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in createDeploymentBackgroundWorkerV4 that resolves a WorkerDeployment by friendlyId alone, without environment, project, or organization scoping. Attackers holding only their own environment API key can POST to the deployment background-workers endpoint with a victim's deployment ID to re-point that in-progress deployment at a worker in the attacker's environment.","summary":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 looks up a WorkerDeployment by its ID alone, without checking environment, project or organization. A user holding only their own environment API key can point another tenant's in-progress deployment at a worker in their own environment.","severity":"high","cvss":7.1,"epss":0.0024,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["background-jobs","multi-tenant","package","self-hosted","trigger.dev"],"not_affected_if":["single-tenant","version-4.5.6-or-later"],"how_to_check":"- Check the installed Trigger.dev version; `4.5.6` or later is not affected.\n- Confirm whether the deployment background-workers endpoint is reachable by tenants with environment API keys (unknown from the sources whether this applies to self-hosted setups).","fix":"- Upgrade Trigger.dev to `4.5.6` or later.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-10-21T01:17:31+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-23T21:57:27+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-10-25T03:32:02+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-25T03:32:02+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.7,"triage":{"at":"2026-10-25T03:32:02Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Upgrade Trigger.dev to `4.5.6` or later.","reach":"internet","title":"Trigger.dev: deployment lookup by ID lets one environment hijack another's deployment","impact":"high","summary":"Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 looks up a WorkerDeployment by its ID alone, without checking environment, project or organization. A user holding only their own environment API key can point another tenant's in-progress deployment at a worker in their own environment.","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["trigger.dev","self-hosted","multi-tenant","background-jobs"],"confidence":0.7,"needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"Attacker re-points another tenant's deployment to their own worker code.","analyst_note":"Confirm from the Trigger.dev release or GHSA whether hosted cloud was patched and whether the endpoint is exposed on self-hosted default configs; check NVD link https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114077.","how_to_check":"- Check the installed Trigger.dev version; `4.5.6` or later is not affected.\n- Confirm whether the deployment background-workers endpoint is reachable by tenants with environment API keys (unknown from the sources whether this applies to self-hosted setups).","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["version-4.5.6-or-later","single-tenant"],"who_is_affected":"Self-hosted or multi-tenant Trigger.dev deployments running versions before `4.5.6`, where more than one tenant or environment holds API keys. Single-tenant installs where only trusted users hold environment keys face much less risk. The sources do not say whether the hosted cloud service has been patched.","user_interaction":"no","needs_special_setup":"unknown","severity_if_unknown":"high"},"cost_usd":0.000655,"input_tokens":3416,"output_tokens":627,"severity_before":"high"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-114077':15A,18A '-2026':14A,17A '4.5.6':32B,74C 'alon':40B,88C 'anoth':10A,58B 'api':54B,101C 'attack':95C,132C 'author':77C 'background':20B,109C 'background-job':19B 'background-work':108C 'bypass':78C 'check':42B 'contain':75C 'createdeploymentbackgroundworkerv4':81C 'cve':13A,16A 'deploy':2A,12A,64B,107C,116C,126C 'endpoint':111C 'environ':8A,43B,53B,71B,90C,100C,134C 'friendlyid':87C 'hijack':9A 'hold':49B,96C 'host':28B 'id':5A,39B,117C 'in-progress':61B,123C 'job':21B 'key':55B,102C 'let':6A 'look':33B 'lookup':3A 'multi':23B 'multi-ten':22B 'one':7A 'organ':46B,93C 'packag':25B 'point':57B,121C 'post':104C 'progress':63B,125C 'project':44B,91C 're':120C 're-point':119C 'resolv':83C 'scope':94C 'self':27B 'self-host':26B 'tenant':24B,59B 'trigger.dev':1A,29B,30B,72C 'user':48B 'victim':114C 'vulner':79C 'without':41B,89C 'worker':67B,110C,129C 'workerdeploy':36B,85C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Self-hosted or multi-tenant Trigger.dev deployments running versions before `4.5.6`, where more than one tenant or environment holds API keys. Single-tenant installs where only trusted users hold environment keys face much less risk. The sources do not say whether the hosted cloud service has been patched.","tier":"B","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-10-21T01:17:31+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","cvss_by":"disclosure@vulncheck.com","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-114077","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114077","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-10-21T01:17:31+00:00","modified_at":"2026-10-22T18:17:27+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-23T21:57:27+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-10-23T22:29:01+00:00","note":null},{"source":"epss","external_id":"CVE-2026-114077","url":"https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-114077","severity":null,"published_at":null,"modified_at":null,"first_seen_at":"2026-10-24T13:15:55+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-10-24T13:15:55+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[],"notice":"Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai"}