Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-113776
Go to dashboardvirtualenv activation scripts can be made to execute attacker-chosen shell or Python code when a path or --prompt contains a placeholder name such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__. An attacker who controls the destination directory name, for example from a CI branch name or a cloned repo, gets code execution when a user activates the environment.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 3h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| virtualenv | pypi | >= 20.26.6, <= 21.14.1 | 21.14.2 |
pip show virtualenv to get the installed version; versions 20.26.6 through 21.14.1 are affected21.14.2 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.
__VIRTUAL_NAME__ holds the environment's directory name, so a destination such as A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x'$(touch PWNED)'y is enough. In the default activate for bash, the VIRTUAL_ENV line renders as:
VIRTUAL_ENV='/tmp/t/A'x'"'"'$(touch PWNED)'"'"'y'B/x'"'"'$(touch PWNED)'"'"'y'
Sourcing that script runs touch PWNED. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. activate.fish runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through activate.xsh and bin/activate_this.py. In activate.csh, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__, breaks the script with Unmatched '''.
No change to quote() can stop this, because the rewrite happens after quote() ran; it defeats shlex.quote and repr() alike.
An attacker needs to influence the destination path or --prompt: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpacked archive.
The bug affects versions 20.26.6 through 21.14.1. Version 20.26.6 first quoted template values (#2768) and introduced the per-key loop.
Fixed in 21.14.2. Activation scripts now keep a placeholder name in the environment's path or prompt as plain text, and activating the example above runs nothing. Fix: https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/602b26623a724827ff171bf11fef4ad186d01f74
Do not create an environment whose path or --prompt contains a placeholder name such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__ or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__, and inspect the generated activation script before you source one you did not create.
Kevin Stubbings (@Kwstubbs) of GitHub Security Lab reported this issue.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-113776")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.