---
id: "CVE-2026-113730"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-113730", "GHSA-crwc-vw2r-qr6m"]
title: "OGNL stricter-invocation block list bypass via java.lang.reflect reflection proxies"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.6
epss: 0.0035800000187009573
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "ognl:ognl", "fixed": ["3.4.13"], "affected": "<= 3.4.12", "ecosystem": "maven"}]
ecosystems: ["maven"]
tags: ["cwe-693", "java", "maven", "ognl", "package", "self-hosted", "struts"]
not_affected_if: ["auth-required", "default-config", "no-untrusted-expressions"]
published_at: "2026-10-20T22:19:30+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:25+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-crwc-vw2r-qr6m", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113730", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:25+00:00"}]
---

# OGNL stricter-invocation block list bypass via java.lang.reflect reflection proxies

OGNL's optional stricter-invocation mode blocks direct calls to dangerous classes like Runtime and ProcessBuilder, but java.lang.reflect.Method can be used to invoke those blocked methods indirectly. An attacker who can feed arbitrary expressions to an OGNL context using the default permissive MemberAccess can run OS commands through this bypass.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- maven:ognl:ognl affected <= 3.4.12 fixed 3.4.13

## How to check

Find where the application evaluates OGNL expressions and check whether any input can be attacker-controlled; check the ognl version in the dependency tree (e.g. mvn dependency:tree | grep ognl).
Confirm whether a restrictive MemberAccess (such as Struts' SecurityMemberAccess) is installed; if not, the block list is the only guard.

## Fix

Upgrade maven:ognl:ognl to 3.4.13 or later.
If upgrade is delayed, install a restrictive MemberAccess that blocks java.lang.reflect and dangerous classes, and do not rely on stricter invocation as a sandbox.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-crwc-vw2r-qr6m
- 2026-10-23T21:57:25+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113730

## From the sources

### Summary

OGNL's optional *stricter invocation* mode maintains a block list that prevents expressions from directly calling methods on dangerous classes such as `Runtime`, `ProcessBuilder`, and `ClassLoader`. The block list filters on the **declaring class of the method OGNL invokes**. Because `java.lang.reflect.Method` (and `Constructor`/`Field`) are not on the list, an expression can use reflection as a proxy — `someMethod.invoke(target, args)` — to reach a blocked method. The real call (e.g. `ProcessBuilder.start()`) then executes inside the JDK reflection machinery and never passes back through OGNL's `invokeMethod`, so the block list never sees it.

### Proof of concept

Under the default OGNL context (public-only access, stricter invocation enabled), the following expression creates a file even though a direct `new ProcessBuilder(...).start()` is blocked:

```
(#pb=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder({"/usr/bin/touch","rce-proof.txt"}),
 #methods=@java.lang.ProcessBuilder@class.getMethods(),
 #names=#methods.{ #this.getName() },
 #startIdx=#names.indexOf("start"),
 #methods[#startIdx].invoke(#pb, null))
```

### Impact and scope — please read carefully

**This is hardening of a defense-in-depth secondary layer, not a break of OGNL's primary security boundary.**

In OGNL the stricter-invocation block list is a *secondary* mitigation. The **primary** access-control gate is the `MemberAccess` implementation supplied by the integrating framework or application, which OGNL consults on every constructor and method call. Frameworks that evaluate untrusted expressions are expected to install a restrictive `MemberAccess` — for example, Apache Struts' `SecurityMemberAccess`, which excludes dangerous classes and the `java.lang.reflect` package. Against such a `MemberAccess` this PoC is blocked at the very first step (the `new ProcessBuilder(...)` constructor), before reflection is ever reachable.

The default context that ships with OGNL intentionally allows all public members and is **not** designed to sandbox untrusted input. An application that evaluates attacker-controlled expressions with that permissive default already has many paths to code execution, and this technique is not required to achieve it.

**You are affected only if all of the following hold:** (1) your application evaluates untrusted/attacker-controlled OGNL expressions, (2) it uses OGNL's default permissive `MemberAccess` (or an equivalently permissive one that allows `java.lang.reflect`), and (3) it relies on the stricter-invocation block list as its sandbox. **Properly configured consumers — including Apache Struts with its `SecurityMemberAccess` — are not affected.** The actual protection for untrusted-expression scenarios remains a correctly configured `MemberAccess`; the block list should not be treated as a sandbox.

### Fix

`java.lang.reflect.Method`, `java.lang.reflect.Constructor`, and `java.lang.reflect.Field` are added to the stricter-invocation block list, so reflection objects can no longer be used as invocation proxies in stricter mode. The `java.lang.invoke.MethodHandle` path was verified not to be exploitable (its signature-polymorphic `invoke`/`invokeExact` fail through OGNL's reflection-based invocation), so no additional classes are required.

### Credit

Reported responsibly through Tidelift by 毛锐 (youyi.mr@alibaba-inc.com).

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