Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-113649
Go to dashboardThe ApostropheCMS Import API writes published variants of content directly without checking the publish permission, so a user who can only edit a content type can create, replace, or remove its published content when publication is restricted to a stronger role. An attacker with import access gets public-state changes they should not be allowed to make.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 3h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| @apostrophecms/import-export | npm | < 3.7.1 | 3.7.1 |
| apostrophe | npm | < 4.34.0 | 4.34.0 |
3.7.1, and whether apostrophe is below 4.34.03.7.1 and apostrophe to 4.34.0Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Package: @apostrophecms/import-export, version 3.7.0.
Release tag reviewed: @apostrophecms/[email protected], commit 9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce (September 30, 2026).
Current main reviewed: 5ce3732be0ebdebb4db0f8ef160c81e8671157e6.
The importer, gzip extractor, import permission gate, and core permission implementation have no differences between that release tag and the reviewed main. This follow-up is a static remediation review. We have not repeated the original end-to-end reproductions against the latest release or tested a deployed site. Current exploitability and impact therefore still require maintainer validation; the observations below establish that the reported security checks remain absent in public source. The original emailed PDF contains the original reproduction material.
The import gate in canImportOrExport() checks the type's import configuration and view permission. The write helpers then call document-manager insert/update directly, including operations on published variants. We did not find the normal publish permission check or beforePublish transition in these helpers. Core permissions intentionally distinguish editRole and publishRole, and the ordinary publication lifecycle enforces that distinction.
The reported security boundary is a content type that an editor may edit but whose publication is reserved for a stronger role. Direct public-state changes through import must enforce the same publication authority. The original report describes unauthorized creation, replacement, or removal of published content under that configuration.
Suggested remediation: centralize authorization for import writes; require publish permission for every non-autopublished published variant, authorize each concrete target, and preflight the complete import before persistent changes. Preserve authorized draft imports and the intended behavior of autopublished types.
Source references:
Vivek R / Winfunc Original reporting team: Mufeed VH / Winfunc
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