{"id":"CVE-2026-113631","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-113631"],"related":[],"title":"ONLYOFFICE Docs: view-only users can export hidden document contents","description":"Incorrect authorization in the sendForm RPC handler and Session JWT reconnect handling in ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) 9.4.0-129 on the official onlyoffice/documentserver container allows an authenticated view-only user to export a reconstructed copy of a document, including content the viewer never displayed such as custom XML, custom document properties and field instruction text, even when download and form-filling are disabled. The attacker reconnects with a valid Session JWT while substituting an attacker-controlled callback URL, which the Session JWT does not bind, then invokes sendForm over RPC, causing DocumentServer to send the reconstructed DOCX to that URL.","summary":"ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) 9.4.0-129 lets a user with view-only access export a rebuilt copy of a document, including hidden content such as custom XML and document properties, even when download is disabled. The attacker swaps in their own callback URL on reconnect so the server sends the reconstructed DOCX to them.","severity":"medium","cvss":6.5,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["docker","document-server","onlyoffice","package","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["managed-hosting","no-view-only-access"],"how_to_check":"- Check the ONLYOFFICE Document Server version, for example with `docker exec <container> cat /etc/onlyoffice/documentserver/product.json` or the image tag, and compare against 9.4.0-129.\n- Check whether view-only sharing is used for sensitive documents on this server.","fix":null,"status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-16T17:39:02+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-16T17:39:02+00:00","category":"package","confidence":0.6,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-16T17:39:02Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"unknown","reach":"network","title":"ONLYOFFICE Docs: view-only users can export hidden document contents","impact":"medium","summary":"ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) 9.4.0-129 lets a user with view-only access export a rebuilt copy of a document, including hidden content such as custom XML and document properties, even when download is disabled. The attacker swaps in their own callback URL on reconnect so the server sends the reconstructed DOCX to them.","audience":"businesses","category":"package","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["onlyoffice","self-hosted","docker","document-server"],"confidence":0.6,"fix_status":"unknown","needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"view-only user exfiltrates hidden document content and metadata","analyst_note":"Confirm the fixed version and vendor patch from the NVD entry and the Rapid7 write-up; the sources here give no fix version.","how_to_check":"- Check the ONLYOFFICE Document Server version, for example with `docker exec <container> cat /etc/onlyoffice/documentserver/product.json` or the image tag, and compare against 9.4.0-129.\n- Check whether view-only sharing is used for sensitive documents on this server.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["managed-hosting","no-view-only-access"],"who_is_affected":"Teams that run ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) themselves, most likely through the official onlyoffice/documentserver container, and share documents with view-only permissions. The attacker needs a valid view-only session, so servers where only trusted editors have access carry less exposure. Hosted or managed ONLYOFFICE services are handled by their vendor.","user_interaction":"no","product_ecosystem":"","needs_special_setup":"unknown","severity_if_unknown":"medium"},"cost_usd":0.00079,"input_tokens":4735,"output_tokens":633,"severity_before":"medium"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-113631':14A,17A '-129':32B,98C '-2026':13A,16A '9.4.0':31B,97C 'access':40B 'allow':104C 'attack':64B,146C,157C 'attacker-control':156C 'authent':106C 'author':81C 'bind':167C 'callback':69B,159C 'caus':173C 'contain':103C 'content':11A,50B,120C 'control':158C 'copi':44B,115C 'custom':53B,127C,129C 'cve':12A,15A 'disabl':62B,144C 'display':124C 'doc':2A,28B,94C 'docker':18B 'document':10A,20B,29B,47B,56B,95C,118C,130C 'document-serv':19B 'documentserv':174C 'docx':79B,179C 'download':60B,138C 'even':58B,136C 'export':8A,41B,112C 'field':133C 'fill':142C 'form':141C 'form-fil':140C 'handl':91C 'handler':86C 'hidden':9A,49B 'host':26B 'includ':48B,119C 'incorrect':80C 'instruct':134C 'invok':169C 'jwt':89C,152C,164C 'let':33B 'never':123C 'offici':101C 'onlyoffic':1A,22B,27B,93C 'onlyoffice/documentserver':102C 'packag':23B 'properti':57B,131C 'rebuilt':43B 'reconnect':72B,90C,147C 'reconstruct':78B,114C,178C 'rpc':85C,172C 'self':25B 'self-host':24B 'send':76B,176C 'sendform':84C,170C 'server':21B,30B,75B,96C 'session':88C,151C,163C 'substitut':154C 'swap':65B 'text':135C 'url':70B,160C,182C 'user':6A,35B,110C 'valid':150C 'view':4A,38B,108C 'view-on':3A,37B,107C 'viewer':122C 'xml':54B,128C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Teams that run ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) themselves, most likely through the official onlyoffice/documentserver container, and share documents with view-only permissions. The attacker needs a valid view-only session, so servers where only trusted editors have access carry less exposure. Hosted or managed ONLYOFFICE services are handled by their vendor.","tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"none","audience":"businesses","plain_action":null,"pkeys":[],"ptokens":[],"labels":["docker","documentserver","medium","onlyoffice","package","selfhosted"],"campaign_type":null,"search_a":"'-113631':14A,17A '-2026':13A,16A 'content':11A 'cve':12A,15A 'doc':2A 'document':10A 'export':8A 'hidden':9A 'onlyoffic':1A 'user':6A 'view':4A 'view-on':3A","search_b":"'-129':32B '9.4.0':31B 'access':40B 'attack':64B 'callback':69B 'content':50B 'copi':44B 'custom':53B 'disabl':62B 'doc':28B 'docker':18B 'document':20B,29B,47B,56B 'document-serv':19B 'docx':79B 'download':60B 'even':58B 'export':41B 'hidden':49B 'host':26B 'includ':48B 'let':33B 'onlyoffic':22B,27B 'packag':23B 'properti':57B 'rebuilt':43B 'reconnect':72B 'reconstruct':78B 'self':25B 'self-host':24B 'send':76B 'server':21B,30B,75B 'swap':65B 'url':70B 'user':35B 'view':38B 'view-on':37B 'xml':54B","search_c":"'-129':98C '9.4.0':97C 'allow':104C 'attack':146C,157C 'attacker-control':156C 'authent':106C 'author':81C 'bind':167C 'callback':159C 'caus':173C 'contain':103C 'content':120C 'control':158C 'copi':115C 'custom':127C,129C 'disabl':144C 'display':124C 'doc':94C 'document':95C,118C,130C 'documentserv':174C 'docx':179C 'download':138C 'even':136C 'export':112C 'field':133C 'fill':142C 'form':141C 'form-fil':140C 'handl':91C 'handler':86C 'includ':119C 'incorrect':80C 'instruct':134C 'invok':169C 'jwt':89C,152C,164C 'never':123C 'offici':101C 'onlyoffic':93C 'onlyoffice/documentserver':102C 'properti':131C 'reconnect':90C,147C 'reconstruct':114C,178C 'rpc':85C,172C 'send':176C 'sendform':84C,170C 'server':96C 'session':88C,151C,163C 'substitut':154C 'text':135C 'url':160C,182C 'user':110C 'valid':150C 'view':108C 'view-on':107C 'viewer':122C 'xml':128C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-16T16:24:38+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","cvss_by":"cve@rapid7.com","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-113631","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113631","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[{"id":171403,"url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed","title":"Rapid7: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs","kind":"advisory","source":"blog","publisher":null,"text":"From view-only access to container root: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs (FIXED)\n\nOverview As part of our research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite , Rapid7 reported five findings in ONLYOFFICE Docs. An attacker with view-only access to a document can chain vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root inside the official DocumentServer container. The findings also expose server files and document data that the viewer never displays, even when downloading is disabled. CVE Finding CVSS CVE-2026-113627 DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery 7.1 High CVE-2026-110385 DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection and code execution 8.7 High CVE-2026-97727 Complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write 6.5 Medium CVE-2026-113630 Root-helper command injection 7.8 High CVE-2026-113631 View-only export of non-rendered document data 6.5 Medium ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0. The changelog describes the release's security changes. Proof-of-concept code is available on the accompanying Github repository . Product description ONLYOFFICE Docs provides online viewers and editors for documents, spreadsheets, presentations, forms and PDFs. It supports collaborative editing and can integrate with applications that store and share files. An integrating application, for example Zimbra Collaboration Suite, supplies an opening configuration identifying the document and the user's permissions, signed with the Browser key. This client-visible credential is referred to below as the Editor JWT. After opening a document, DocumentServer issues a Session JWT for reconnecting and saving. Incoming service requests, including document-building jobs, are validated using ONLYOFFICE's Inbox JWT key. DocumentServer can also send generated document output to the integrating application's callback URL. Credit This assessment and the exploit-chain research were conducted by Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat), Senior Security Researcher at Rapid7 . The findings are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy . Testing setup Rapid7 tested the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 image with package onlyoffice-documentserver 9.4.0-129 . DocumentServer ran as the ds account. JWT validation remained enabled, and no authentication check, private-address filter, or vendor code was disabled or modified. Browser and Inbox validation used the same effective signing key. Our analysis of the vendor supplied fixes compares the v9.4.0.129 and v10.0.0.169 tags of ONLYOFFICE/server , ONLYOFFICE/core and ONLYOFFICE/document-server-package . Rapid7 also performed targeted checks on package 10.0.0-169 . For the conditional WOPI test on 9.4.0-129 , Rapid7 enabled only WOPI_ENABLED=true and left the shipped WOPI IP filter unchanged at its default allow-all rule. Exploitation was demonstrated only on 9.4.0-129; the broader affected-version range is unknown. Impact View-only document access can lead to command execution as ds and then root inside the official container. The two exploit chains use different file-write stages. With WOPI enabled and an attacker-controlled source reachable and permitted by its IP filter, the same DocBuilder authorization failure provides an unauthenticated entry. Separately, a viewer denied download can obtain a reconstructed DOCX containing custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that the viewer never displayed. Editor JWT authorizes native file reads and session JWT forgery (CVE-2026-113627) An attacker with view-only access to a document can use /docbuilder to steal files from the ONLYOFFICE server. In the tested build, this exposed the Session JWT signing key, allowing the attacker to forge credentials containing document keys and permissions that were never granted to the original viewer. Technical analysis Prerequisite: The attacker needs a valid Editor JWT for any document and access to /docbuilder . Target files must be readable by ds . The token-forge","published_at":"2026-11-16T16:24:38+00:00","relation":"mentions","confidence":null,"note":null}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}