{"id":"CVE-2026-113630","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-113630"],"related":[],"title":"ONLYOFFICE Docs: maintenance helper lets a local user run commands as root","description":"Command injection in the documentserver-flush-cache.sh maintenance helper in ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) 9.4.0-129 on the official onlyoffice/documentserver container allows a local attacker with command execution as the ds user to execute arbitrary commands as root via a crafted --hash argument that is interpolated unvalidated into a GNU sed expression, where the sed e flag runs attacker-controlled commands. The packaged sudoers policy permits ds to run the helper as root without a password and with unrestricted arguments.","summary":"A command injection flaw in the documentserver-flush-cache.sh helper of ONLYOFFICE Docs lets a user who can already run commands as the ds account pass a crafted --hash argument that reaches a GNU sed expression. The sed e flag then executes attacker-chosen commands as root, because the packaged sudoers policy lets ds run the helper as root without a password.","severity":"high","cvss":7.8,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"onlyoffice-documentserver","fixed":["10.0.0-169"],"affected":"9.4.0-129 confirmed; earlier versions unknown, < 10.0.0-169","ecosystem":"vendor"}],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["docker","document-server","onlyoffice","other","self-hosted"],"not_affected_if":["document-server-10.0-or-later","managed-hosting","no-onlyoffice-install"],"how_to_check":"Check the Document Server version in the container: docker exec <container> dpkg -s onlyoffice-documentserver (Version below 10.0.0-169 is exposed; only 9.4.0-129 was tested). Run sudo -l -U ds inside the container and look for a NOPASSWD rule for documentserver-flush-cache.sh. The attacker first needs command execution as ds, so also check the other ONLYOFFICE issues from the same Rapid7 report (CVE-2026-113627, CVE-2026-110385), which can give that foothold.","fix":"Upgrade to ONLYOFFICE Document Server 10.0 (package 10.0.0-169). The flush-cache helper (renamed documentserver-flush-cache) now rejects --hash values outside [A-Za-z0-9._-]. The sudoers rule letting ds run it as root without a password is still present in 10.0, so the fix is input validation only.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-16T17:38:50+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-16T17:40:14+00:00","category":"other","confidence":0.8,"triage":{"at":"2026-11-16T17:38:50Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"unknown","reach":"local","title":"ONLYOFFICE Docs: maintenance helper lets a local user run commands as root","impact":"high","summary":"A command injection flaw in the documentserver-flush-cache.sh helper of ONLYOFFICE Docs lets a user who can already run commands as the ds account pass a crafted --hash argument that reaches a GNU sed expression. The sed e flag then executes attacker-chosen commands as root, because the packaged sudoers policy lets ds run the helper as root without a password.","audience":"businesses","category":"other","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["onlyoffice","document-server","docker","self-hosted"],"confidence":0.7,"fix_status":"unknown","needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"attacker gains root on the container after a foothold as ds","analyst_note":"Find the fixed Document Server version and sudoers hardening from the ONLYOFFICE advisory or the Rapid7 post; the sources here give no fix.","how_to_check":"- Run `docker exec <container> id` to confirm the container is on the official onlyoffice/documentserver image, then check its version against the Document Server 9.4.0-129 build named in the report.\n- Run `sudo -l -U ds` inside the container and look for a NOPASSWD rule that lets ds run documentserver-flush-cache.sh as root.\n- unknown for any other exposure check; the sources do not give further steps.","plain_action":"","product_name":"","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["no-onlyoffice-install","managed-hosting"],"who_is_affected":"Teams that run the ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) container, in particular the official onlyoffice/documentserver image at version 9.4.0-129, are exposed. The attacker needs command execution as the ds user first, so the risk is local escalation after another foothold; hosts that do not run this image can skip it.","user_interaction":"no","product_ecosystem":"","needs_special_setup":"no","severity_if_unknown":"high"},"cost_usd":0.000811,"input_tokens":4687,"output_tokens":684,"severity_before":"high"},"analyst_status":"done","analyst_note":"Find the fixed Document Server version and sudoers hardening from the ONLYOFFICE advisory or the Rapid7 post; the sources here give no fix.","search":"'-113630':15A,18A '-129':105C '-2026':14A,17A '9.4.0':104C 'account':53B 'allow':111C 'alreadi':47B 'arbitrari':124C 'argument':58B,132C,170C 'attack':72B,114C,149C 'attacker-chosen':71B 'attacker-control':148C 'chosen':73B 'command':10A,32B,49B,74B,92C,116C,125C,151C 'contain':110C 'control':150C 'craft':56B,130C 'cve':13A,16A 'doc':2A,41B,101C 'docker':22B 'document':24B,102C 'document-serv':23B 'documentserver':21A 'documentserver-flush-cache.sh':37B,96C 'ds':52B,83B,120C,157C 'e':67B,145C 'execut':70B,117C,123C 'express':64B,141C 'flag':68B,146C 'flaw':34B 'gnu':62B,139C 'hash':57B,131C 'helper':4A,38B,86B,98C,161C 'host':30B 'inject':33B,93C 'interpol':135C 'let':5A,42B,82B 'local':7A,113C 'mainten':3A,97C 'offici':108C 'onlyoffic':1A,26B,40B,100C 'onlyoffice':20A 'onlyoffice-documentserver':19A 'onlyoffice/documentserver':109C 'packag':79B,153C 'pass':54B 'password':91B,166C 'permit':156C 'polici':81B,155C 'reach':60B 'root':12A,76B,88B,127C,163C 'run':9A,48B,84B,147C,159C 'sed':63B,66B,140C,144C 'self':29B 'self-host':28B 'server':25B,103C 'sudoer':80B,154C 'unrestrict':169C 'unvalid':136C 'user':8A,44B,121C 'via':128C 'without':89B,164C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Teams that run the ONLYOFFICE Docs (Document Server) container, in particular the official onlyoffice/documentserver image at version 9.4.0-129, are exposed. The attacker needs command execution as the ds user first, so the risk is local escalation after another foothold; hosts that do not run this image can skip it.","tier":"B","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"available","audience":"businesses","plain_action":null,"pkeys":["onlyofficedocumentserver"],"ptokens":["documentserver","onlyoffice"],"labels":["docker","documentserver","high","onlyoffice","other","selfhosted"],"campaign_type":null,"search_a":"'-113630':15A,18A '-2026':14A,17A 'command':10A 'cve':13A,16A 'doc':2A 'documentserver':21A 'helper':4A 'let':5A 'local':7A 'mainten':3A 'onlyoffic':1A 'onlyoffice':20A 'onlyoffice-documentserver':19A 'root':12A 'run':9A 'user':8A","search_b":"'account':53B 'alreadi':47B 'argument':58B 'attack':72B 'attacker-chosen':71B 'chosen':73B 'command':32B,49B,74B 'craft':56B 'doc':41B 'docker':22B 'document':24B 'document-serv':23B 'documentserver-flush-cache.sh':37B 'ds':52B,83B 'e':67B 'execut':70B 'express':64B 'flag':68B 'flaw':34B 'gnu':62B 'hash':57B 'helper':38B,86B 'host':30B 'inject':33B 'let':42B,82B 'onlyoffic':26B,40B 'packag':79B 'pass':54B 'password':91B 'polici':81B 'reach':60B 'root':76B,88B 'run':48B,84B 'sed':63B,66B 'self':29B 'self-host':28B 'server':25B 'sudoer':80B 'user':44B 'without':89B","search_c":"'-129':105C '9.4.0':104C 'allow':111C 'arbitrari':124C 'argument':132C,170C 'attack':114C,149C 'attacker-control':148C 'command':92C,116C,125C,151C 'contain':110C 'control':150C 'craft':130C 'doc':101C 'document':102C 'documentserver-flush-cache.sh':96C 'ds':120C,157C 'e':145C 'execut':117C,123C 'express':141C 'flag':146C 'gnu':139C 'hash':131C 'helper':98C,161C 'inject':93C 'interpol':135C 'local':113C 'mainten':97C 'offici':108C 'onlyoffic':100C 'onlyoffice/documentserver':109C 'packag':153C 'password':166C 'permit':156C 'polici':155C 'root':127C,163C 'run':147C,159C 'sed':140C,144C 'server':103C 'sudoer':154C 'unrestrict':169C 'unvalid':136C 'user':121C 'via':128C 'without':164C","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-16T16:24:38+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","cvss_by":"cve@rapid7.com","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-113630","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113630","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-16T17:17:29+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T17:37:55+00:00","note":null},{"source":"analyst","external_id":"CVE-2026-113630:4144","url":null,"severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-16T17:40:14+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-16T17:40:14+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T17:40:14+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T17:40:14+00:00","note":"Read Rapid7 post (researcher, relays ONLYOFFICE confirmation 2026-10-23): fixed in Document Server 10.0 (pkg 10.0.0-169) by HASH validation [A-Za-z0-9._-]; sudoers NOPASSWD grant for ds remains. Tested only on 9.4.0-129; wider range unknown. No ITW statement. Not verified: no vendor-own page read."}],"documents":[{"id":171403,"url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed","title":"Rapid7: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs","kind":"advisory","source":"blog","publisher":null,"text":"From view-only access to container root: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs (FIXED)\n\nOverview As part of our research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite , Rapid7 reported five findings in ONLYOFFICE Docs. An attacker with view-only access to a document can chain vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root inside the official DocumentServer container. The findings also expose server files and document data that the viewer never displays, even when downloading is disabled. CVE Finding CVSS CVE-2026-113627 DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery 7.1 High CVE-2026-110385 DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection and code execution 8.7 High CVE-2026-97727 Complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write 6.5 Medium CVE-2026-113630 Root-helper command injection 7.8 High CVE-2026-113631 View-only export of non-rendered document data 6.5 Medium ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0. The changelog describes the release's security changes. Proof-of-concept code is available on the accompanying Github repository . Product description ONLYOFFICE Docs provides online viewers and editors for documents, spreadsheets, presentations, forms and PDFs. It supports collaborative editing and can integrate with applications that store and share files. An integrating application, for example Zimbra Collaboration Suite, supplies an opening configuration identifying the document and the user's permissions, signed with the Browser key. This client-visible credential is referred to below as the Editor JWT. After opening a document, DocumentServer issues a Session JWT for reconnecting and saving. Incoming service requests, including document-building jobs, are validated using ONLYOFFICE's Inbox JWT key. DocumentServer can also send generated document output to the integrating application's callback URL. Credit This assessment and the exploit-chain research were conducted by Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat), Senior Security Researcher at Rapid7 . The findings are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy . Testing setup Rapid7 tested the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 image with package onlyoffice-documentserver 9.4.0-129 . DocumentServer ran as the ds account. JWT validation remained enabled, and no authentication check, private-address filter, or vendor code was disabled or modified. Browser and Inbox validation used the same effective signing key. Our analysis of the vendor supplied fixes compares the v9.4.0.129 and v10.0.0.169 tags of ONLYOFFICE/server , ONLYOFFICE/core and ONLYOFFICE/document-server-package . Rapid7 also performed targeted checks on package 10.0.0-169 . For the conditional WOPI test on 9.4.0-129 , Rapid7 enabled only WOPI_ENABLED=true and left the shipped WOPI IP filter unchanged at its default allow-all rule. Exploitation was demonstrated only on 9.4.0-129; the broader affected-version range is unknown. Impact View-only document access can lead to command execution as ds and then root inside the official container. The two exploit chains use different file-write stages. With WOPI enabled and an attacker-controlled source reachable and permitted by its IP filter, the same DocBuilder authorization failure provides an unauthenticated entry. Separately, a viewer denied download can obtain a reconstructed DOCX containing custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that the viewer never displayed. Editor JWT authorizes native file reads and session JWT forgery (CVE-2026-113627) An attacker with view-only access to a document can use /docbuilder to steal files from the ONLYOFFICE server. In the tested build, this exposed the Session JWT signing key, allowing the attacker to forge credentials containing document keys and permissions that were never granted to the original viewer. Technical analysis Prerequisite: The attacker needs a valid Editor JWT for any document and access to /docbuilder . Target files must be readable by ds . The token-forge","published_at":"2026-11-16T16:24:38+00:00","relation":"mentions","confidence":null,"note":null},{"id":171403,"url":"https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-from-view-only-access-to-container-root-five-vulnerabilities-in-onlyoffice-docs-fixed","title":"Rapid7: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs","kind":"advisory","source":"blog","publisher":null,"text":"From view-only access to container root: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs (FIXED)\n\nOverview As part of our research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite , Rapid7 reported five findings in ONLYOFFICE Docs. An attacker with view-only access to a document can chain vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root inside the official DocumentServer container. The findings also expose server files and document data that the viewer never displays, even when downloading is disabled. CVE Finding CVSS CVE-2026-113627 DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery 7.1 High CVE-2026-110385 DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection and code execution 8.7 High CVE-2026-97727 Complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write 6.5 Medium CVE-2026-113630 Root-helper command injection 7.8 High CVE-2026-113631 View-only export of non-rendered document data 6.5 Medium ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0. The changelog describes the release's security changes. Proof-of-concept code is available on the accompanying Github repository . Product description ONLYOFFICE Docs provides online viewers and editors for documents, spreadsheets, presentations, forms and PDFs. It supports collaborative editing and can integrate with applications that store and share files. An integrating application, for example Zimbra Collaboration Suite, supplies an opening configuration identifying the document and the user's permissions, signed with the Browser key. This client-visible credential is referred to below as the Editor JWT. After opening a document, DocumentServer issues a Session JWT for reconnecting and saving. Incoming service requests, including document-building jobs, are validated using ONLYOFFICE's Inbox JWT key. DocumentServer can also send generated document output to the integrating application's callback URL. Credit This assessment and the exploit-chain research were conducted by Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat), Senior Security Researcher at Rapid7 . The findings are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy . Testing setup Rapid7 tested the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 image with package onlyoffice-documentserver 9.4.0-129 . DocumentServer ran as the ds account. JWT validation remained enabled, and no authentication check, private-address filter, or vendor code was disabled or modified. Browser and Inbox validation used the same effective signing key. Our analysis of the vendor supplied fixes compares the v9.4.0.129 and v10.0.0.169 tags of ONLYOFFICE/server , ONLYOFFICE/core and ONLYOFFICE/document-server-package . Rapid7 also performed targeted checks on package 10.0.0-169 . For the conditional WOPI test on 9.4.0-129 , Rapid7 enabled only WOPI_ENABLED=true and left the shipped WOPI IP filter unchanged at its default allow-all rule. Exploitation was demonstrated only on 9.4.0-129; the broader affected-version range is unknown. Impact View-only document access can lead to command execution as ds and then root inside the official container. The two exploit chains use different file-write stages. With WOPI enabled and an attacker-controlled source reachable and permitted by its IP filter, the same DocBuilder authorization failure provides an unauthenticated entry. Separately, a viewer denied download can obtain a reconstructed DOCX containing custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that the viewer never displayed. Editor JWT authorizes native file reads and session JWT forgery (CVE-2026-113627) An attacker with view-only access to a document can use /docbuilder to steal files from the ONLYOFFICE server. In the tested build, this exposed the Session JWT signing key, allowing the attacker to forge credentials containing document keys and permissions that were never granted to the original viewer. Technical analysis Prerequisite: The attacker needs a valid Editor JWT for any document and access to /docbuilder . Target files must be readable by ds . The token-forge","published_at":"2026-11-16T16:24:38+00:00","relation":"advisory","confidence":null,"note":null}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}