---
id: "CVE-2026-112897"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-112897", "GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg"]
title: "Pillow: TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.7
epss: 0.0029100000392645597
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "Pillow", "fixed": ["13.0.0"], "affected": ">= 5.3.0, < 13.0.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["cwe-908", "image-upload", "package", "pillow", "python", "web-backend"]
not_affected_if: ["no-untrusted-tiff-input", "pillow-below-5.3.0-or-13.0.0-plus", "tiff-decoding-disabled"]
published_at: "2026-10-19T22:17:09+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:19+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112897", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:19+00:00"}]
---

# Pillow: TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips

Pillow returns leftover heap memory as image pixels when it decodes a small crafted JPEG-compressed or Group 4 TIFF whose strip or tile is shorter than declared. An attacker who can submit an image and get something derived from its pixels back, such as a thumbnail or converted copy, can read memory the worker process previously used and freed.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- pypi:Pillow affected >= 5.3.0, < 13.0.0 fixed 13.0.0

## How to check

pip show pillow (or python -c "import PIL; print(PIL.__version__)") and check whether it is >= 5.3.0 and < 13.0.0
Search app dependency lockfiles for Pillow versions in that range
If unsure, run the reproducer from the advisory against the installed Pillow

## Fix

Upgrade Pillow to 13.0.0 or later
Until upgraded, do not return pixel-derived output (thumbnails, previews, conversions) for untrusted TIFF uploads

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T19:11:32+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q45j-58j2-45rg
- 2026-10-23T21:57:19+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112897

## From the sources

```
============================================================================
TiffDecode returns uninitialized memory as pixels for short JPEG strips
Location: src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:554  in _decodeStrip()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```

Pillow hands back leftover process memory as image pixels when it opens a small crafted TIFF file. Anyone who can get an application to open their image, and can see something produced from its pixels (a thumbnail, a preview, a converted copy), can read heap memory that the process had previously used and freed. This works in the default configuration: opening and loading the 478-byte file succeeds with no error or warning, and every row below the first eight holds stale memory instead of picture content.

The bug is in `_decodeStrip()` in `src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c`, and `_decodeTile()` has the same shape. The function `realloc()`s `state->buffer` to `TIFFStripSize()` bytes without initialising it and calls `TIFFReadEncodedStrip()`. Whenever that call does not return -1, it copies all `RowsPerStrip` rows of the buffer into the image. libtiff's JPEG codec only warns when the JPEG embedded in a strip has fewer rows than the strip, and Pillow silences libtiff warnings. The codec decodes the rows that exist and still returns the full strip size, so the untouched remainder is copied out as pixels. libtiff's Group 4 fax codec behaves the same way for a stream that ends early.

The attached reproducer builds a 256×256 TIFF whose single strip or tile is a 256×8 JPEG. Before loading it, the script frees buffers filled with `b"LEAK"`. It then finds 15,872 copies of `LEAK` in rows 8–255 of the decoded image (the same freed chunk was reused in 500 of 500 runs). Under glibc's `MALLOC_PERTURB_`, those rows are entirely the allocator's fill byte. A well-formed control file decodes correctly in both cases.

This is a read of uninitialised heap memory, not memory corruption. Each strip can disclose up to width × `RowsPerStrip` bytes, and what comes back depends on the allocator's state at the time. The strip path was introduced in e91b851fdc1c ("Add reading old-JPEG compressed TIFFs", first released in Pillow 6.0.0). The tile path has had the same pattern since f0436a4ddc95 (Pillow 5.3.0).

## Details

`src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c` decodes compressed TIFFs through libtiff into a strip
(or tile) buffer that it `realloc()`s to `TIFFStripSize()` bytes and never initialises, and
then copies all `RowsPerStrip` rows of that buffer into the image whenever
`TIFFReadEncodedStrip()` does not return -1. libtiff's JPEG codec does not fail when the
JPEG stream inside a strip has fewer rows than the strip: it decodes the rows that exist
and returns the full strip size. The rows it did not write are whatever the heap held
before, and Pillow returns them as pixels.

A 478-byte file shows it: a classic little-endian TIFF, 256×256, `BitsPerSample=8`,
`Compression=7`, `PhotometricInterpretation=1`, `RowsPerStrip=256`, one strip whose data
is a baseline JPEG of 256×**8** pixels (as written by `Image.new("L",(256,8),200).save(…,"JPEG")`).
`Image.open(BytesIO(data)).load()` succeeds with default settings (compressed TIFFs always
take the libtiff path). Rows 0–7 of the result are the JPEG content (value 200); the
remaining 63488 bytes of `im.tobytes()` are heap garbage: run under glibc's
`MALLOC_PERTURB_=1` they are all `0xFE`, under `MALLOC_PERTURB_=170` all `0x55` (the
fresh-`malloc` fill byte), and in a process that has just freed buffers containing
`b"LEAK"` they contain 15872 copies of `LEAK`.

Feeding the same file to libtiff 4.5.0 directly confirms the library side:
`TIFFReadEncodedStrip(t, 0, buf, 65536)` prints
`JPEGPreDecode: Warning, Improper JPEG strip/tile size, expected 256x256, got 256x8.`,
returns 65536, and leaves 63488 of the 65536 buffer bytes untouched. Pillow installs
`TIFFSetWarningHandler(NULL)` (`TiffDecode.c:682`), so the warning is not visible either.

The strip path:

```c
// src/libImaging/TiffDecode.c:552
    /* realloc to fit whole strip */
    /* malloc check above */
    new_data = realloc(state->buffer, state->bytes);      // state->bytes = TIFFStripSize()
    …
    state->buffer = new_data;

    for (; state->y < state->ysize; state->y += rows_per_strip) {
        …
            if (TIFFReadEncodedStrip(
                    tiff,
                    TIFFComputeStrip(tiff, state->y, plane),
                    (tdata_t)state->buffer,
                    strip_size
                ) == -1) {
                … return -1;
            }
            …
            // iterate over each row in the strip and stuff data into image
            for (strip_row = 0;
                 strip_row < MIN((INT32)rows_per_strip, state->ysize - state->y);
                 strip_row++) {
                …
                shuffler(
                    (UINT8 *)im->image[state->y + state->yoff + strip_row] +
                        state->xoff * im->pixelsize,
                    state->buffer + strip_row * row_byte_size,
                    state->xsize
                );
```

`state->buffer` arrives here as the one-row `calloc` made by `decode.c:230`
(`(bits*xsize+7)/8` = 256 bytes for the example). The `realloc` to 65536 bytes hands back
a different, uninitialised chunk; nothing zeroes it. `TIFFReadEncodedStrip()` returns the
nominal strip size on success, not the number of rows produced, and the only check is
`== -1`, so the row loop unconditionally copies 256 rows × 256 bytes into `im->image`
(which itself is zeroed by `core.new`, so the garbage provably comes from `state->buffer`).
`_decodeTile()` has the same shape (`TiffDecode.c:448` `realloc` to `TIFFTileSize()`, then
`tile_length` rows copied after each `TIFFReadTile()` at 460–488).

For a well-formed file the JPEG inside the strip is 256×256, libtiff fills all 65536 bytes
and the copy is correct. The malicious file differs only in the SOF height of the embedded
JPEG; libtiff treats "JPEG smaller than strip" as a warning, clamps the row count to the
JPEG height, and reports success.

JPEG is not the only libtiff codec that succeeds on a short strip. `Fax4Decode`
(`Compression=4`) returns success for a T.6 stream that ends early: a 133-byte 512×256
1-bit TIFF whose strip is the Group 4 stream of a 512×16 image loads without error,
libtiff writes 17 rows (1088 bytes) of the 16384-byte buffer
(`Fax4Decode: Warning, Premature EOL at line 16`, return value 16384) and the other
15296 bytes are again heap contents. LZW, Deflate, PackBits, Group 3 and CCITT RLE were
checked and do return -1 on short data, so Pillow raises `OSError` for those.

The strip path was introduced in `e91b851fdc1c` ("Add reading old-JPEG compressed TIFFs",
2018-12-08), first released in Pillow 6.0.0, which replaced row-by-row `TIFFReadScanline()`
(where libtiff errors on the first missing row) with the whole-strip `realloc()` and copy.
The tile path has had the same shape since it was added in `f0436a4ddc95` (2018-07-02,
Pillow 5.3.0).

## Impact

Any application that opens attacker-supplied images with Pillow in the default
configuration and returns something derived from the pixels (thumbnail, preview, format
conversion, OCR text) discloses freed heap memory of the worker process to the uploader:
everything below the rows the embedded JPEG/G4 stream actually encodes, up to
`ImageWidth × RowsPerStrip × SamplesPerPixel` bytes per strip and tens of MB per image
within the default `MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS`. `load()` raises nothing, so the application has no
signal that the image is malformed. What comes back depends on allocator state; in a
long-running web worker it is typically recently freed request bodies, other users'
decoded image buffers and Python object contents. There is no memory corruption; this is
a read of uninitialised (previously used) heap memory, analogous in effect to an
out-of-bounds read that lands 

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_
