Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-112377
Go to dashboardCCC Attestation SIG's attested-tls-poc, a demo of attestation inside the TLS handshake, does not bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection. An attacker with an extracted attested-TLS private key can relay the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester, replay its Evidence, impersonate the attested workload and intercept data. The maintainers marked the PoC as vulnerable and have not shipped a fix.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| attested-tls-poc | github | <= 731ca82ed533fc7a1092be980887ae2e34261da2 | – |
git log or inspect your vendored commit and compare it to 731ca82ed533fc7a1092be980887ae2e34261da2Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 fails to bind early attestation Evidence to the TLS connection, allowing attackers to relay valid Evidence from a genuine attester. Attackers holding an extracted attested TLS private key can forward the relying party's nonce to a genuine attester and replay its Evidence to impersonate the attested workload and intercept data.
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