---
id: "CVE-2026-112345"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-112345"]
title: "TTLock smart locks: hardcoded AES key lets nearby attackers unlock doors"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.6
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["android", "bluetooth", "infrastructure", "iot", "smart-lock", "ttlock"]
not_affected_if: ["ios-only", "no-ttlock-devices"]
published_at: "2026-10-26T15:16:38+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T16:03:38+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112345", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00"}]
---

# TTLock smart locks: hardcoded AES key lets nearby attackers unlock doors

The TTLock Android app and its smart-lock firmware ship a hardcoded static AES key used to protect the per-pairing session key sent over Bluetooth Low Energy. A nearby attacker can record a pairing exchange, decrypt the session key with the embedded key, and forge requests to unlock the lock or add access codes.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the TTLock Android app version; affected builds are earlier than `9.8.260718`
- Identify smart locks paired through TTLock and check their firmware against the vendor's advisory (unknown from sources)

## Fix

- Update the TTLock Android app to `9.8.260718` or later
- Update lock firmware to the vendor-supplied fixed version (unknown from sources)
- Re-pair locks after updating and review access codes and fingerprints (unknown from sources)

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112345

## From the sources

TTLock Android application before v9.8.260718 and associated smart-lock firmware contain a hardcoded static AES key vulnerability that allows an attacker within Bluetooth range to decrypt the per-pairing session key transmitted during BLE pairing. Attackers can observe the pairing exchange, recover the persistent session key using the embedded defaultKey, and forge authenticated BLE requests to unlock the device, add fingerprints or access codes, and perform administrative actions without authentication or user interaction.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_