{"id":"CVE-2026-112345","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-112345"],"related":[],"title":"TTLock smart locks: hardcoded AES key lets nearby attackers unlock doors","description":"TTLock Android application before v9.8.260718 and associated smart-lock firmware contain a hardcoded static AES key vulnerability that allows an attacker within Bluetooth range to decrypt the per-pairing session key transmitted during BLE pairing. Attackers can observe the pairing exchange, recover the persistent session key using the embedded defaultKey, and forge authenticated BLE requests to unlock the device, add fingerprints or access codes, and perform administrative actions without authentication or user interaction.","summary":"The TTLock Android app and its smart-lock firmware ship a hardcoded static AES key used to protect the per-pairing session key sent over Bluetooth Low Energy. A nearby attacker can record a pairing exchange, decrypt the session key with the embedded key, and forge requests to unlock the lock or add access codes.","severity":"high","cvss":8.6,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["android","bluetooth","infrastructure","iot","smart-lock","ttlock"],"not_affected_if":["ios-only","no-ttlock-devices"],"how_to_check":"- Check the TTLock Android app version; affected builds are earlier than `9.8.260718`\n- Identify smart locks paired through TTLock and check their firmware against the vendor's advisory (unknown from sources)","fix":"- Update the TTLock Android app to `9.8.260718` or later\n- Update lock firmware to the vendor-supplied fixed version (unknown from sources)\n- Re-pair locks after updating and review access codes and fingerprints (unknown from sources)","status":"open","published_at":"2026-10-26T15:16:38+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-10-26T16:03:38+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-26T16:03:38+00:00","category":"infrastructure","confidence":0.7,"triage":{"at":"2026-10-26T16:03:38Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Update the TTLock Android app to `9.8.260718` or later\n- Update lock firmware to the vendor-supplied fixed version (unknown from sources)\n- Re-pair locks after updating and review access codes and fingerprints (unknown from sources)","reach":"network","title":"TTLock smart locks: hardcoded AES key lets nearby attackers unlock doors","impact":"high","summary":"The TTLock Android app and its smart-lock firmware ship a hardcoded static AES key used to protect the per-pairing session key sent over Bluetooth Low Energy. A nearby attacker can record a pairing exchange, decrypt the session key with the embedded key, and forge requests to unlock the lock or add access codes.","category":"infrastructure","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["ttlock","smart-lock","android","bluetooth","iot"],"confidence":0.7,"needs_auth":"no","worst_case":"Attacker unlocks the door and adds access codes without authentication","analyst_note":"Confirm the firmware fixed version and whether iOS builds are affected; check the vendor advisory linked from the NVD entry.","how_to_check":"- Check the TTLock Android app version; affected builds are earlier than `9.8.260718`\n- Identify smart locks paired through TTLock and check their firmware against the vendor's advisory (unknown from sources)","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["no-ttlock-devices","ios-only"],"who_is_affected":"Anyone who uses the TTLock Android app to pair and manage Bluetooth smart locks, and the locks themselves, since the flaw is in both the app and the firmware. The sources do not say whether iOS builds or locks managed by other apps are affected. Teams that never used TTLock hardware can skip it.","user_interaction":"no","needs_special_setup":"no","severity_if_unknown":"high"},"cost_usd":0.000662,"input_tokens":3385,"output_tokens":647,"severity_before":"high"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-112345':14A,17A '-2026':13A,16A 'access':81B,147C 'action':152C 'add':80B,144C 'administr':151C 'ae':5A,40B,98C 'allow':102C 'android':18B,28B,84C 'app':29B 'applic':85C 'associ':89C 'attack':9A,58B,104C,120C 'authent':137C,154C 'ble':118C,138C 'bluetooth':19B,53B,106C 'code':82B,148C 'contain':94C 'cve':12A,15A 'decrypt':64B,109C 'defaultkey':134C 'devic':143C 'door':11A 'embed':70B,133C 'energi':55B 'exchang':63B,125C 'fingerprint':145C 'firmwar':35B,93C 'forg':73B,136C 'hardcod':4A,38B,96C 'infrastructur':20B 'interact':157C 'iot':21B 'key':6A,41B,50B,67B,71B,99C,115C,130C 'let':7A 'lock':3A,24B,34B,78B,92C 'low':54B 'nearbi':8A,57B 'observ':122C 'pair':48B,62B,113C,119C,124C 'per':47B,112C 'per-pair':46B,111C 'perform':150C 'persist':128C 'protect':44B 'rang':107C 'record':60B 'recov':126C 'request':74B,139C 'sent':51B 'session':49B,66B,114C,129C 'ship':36B 'smart':2A,23B,33B,91C 'smart-lock':22B,32B,90C 'static':39B,97C 'transmit':116C 'ttlock':1A,25B,27B,83C 'unlock':10A,76B,141C 'use':42B,131C 'user':156C 'v9.8.260718':87C 'vulner':100C 'within':105C 'without':153C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Anyone who uses the TTLock Android app to pair and manage Bluetooth smart locks, and the locks themselves, since the flaw is in both the app and the firmware. The sources do not say whether iOS builds or locks managed by other apps are affected. Teams that never used TTLock hardware can skip it.","tier":"B","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-10-26T15:16:38+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","cvss_by":"disclosure@vulncheck.com","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-112345","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112345","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-10-26T15:16:38+00:00","modified_at":"2026-10-26T15:16:38+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-10-26T16:02:25+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[],"notice":"Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai"}