Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-112081
Go to dashboardhanlp.load() resolves the classpath strings in a model package's JSON config with a bare importlib import and instantiates the class with attacker-chosen arguments. A crafted model package can make HanLP fetch an attacker URL and parse it with fasttext. The reporter says this is not arbitrary RCE. The PoC is public in issue #1969 and the maintainer has not responded.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams that call hanlp.load on model config or classpath values that can come from users, requests, or remote sources. Applications that only load fixed, locally bundled HanLP models with hardcoded paths are less exposed. The sources do not say which HanLP release fixes the issue, and the project had not responded at the time of the report.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| hanlp | pypi | <= 2.1.0-beta.64 | – |
pip show hanlp; versions up to 2.1.0b64 (2.1.0-beta.64) are listed as affected, and the NVD list covers beta.0 to beta.64v2.1.1) was not confirmed as fixedEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
A vulnerability was determined in hankcs HanLP up to 2.1.0-beta.64. This affects the function hanlp.load of the file plugins/hanlp_common/hanlp_common/reflection.py of the component Model Config Loading. This manipulation of the argument classpath causes deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
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