Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-112077
Go to dashboardIn radare2 6.2.0 and 6.2.2, the HTTP server's sandbox setting does not block command execution because the default sandbox grain still allows exec. A remote user who can reach the HTTP command endpoint can therefore spawn processes on the host.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only teams that run radare2's HTTP server and make it reachable by people they do not trust. Local CLI use and HTTP servers bound to localhost or behind authentication are much lower risk. The maintainer notes the server must first be started and exposed, so it is not a remote flaw by default.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
r2 -v to read the installed radare2 version and confirm it is 6.2.0 or 6.2.2=h or -e http.port in scripts or service files that run radare2 over HTTP/cmd endpoint is exposed beyond trusted users6.2.4 or later (patch 18fd12efa98a7d1977de7bdd379d8a848777b90f)e cfg.sandbox.grain=... with exec removed, and restrict access to the HTTP portEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
A vulnerability was detected in radareorg radare2 6.2.0/6.2.2. This issue affects the function r_core_cmd_str_pipe in the library libr/core/rtr_http.inc.c of the component HTTP Sandbox Policy Handler. Performing a manipulation results in protection mechanism failure. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. Upgrading to version 6.2.4 is capable of addressing this issue. The patch is named 18fd12efa98a7d1977de7bdd379d8a848777b90f. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. The pre-requisite of the vulnerability is reflected by the CVSS vector. One of the project maintainers explains: "There is a real sandbox configuration issue here, but the report overstates it. The HTTP server defaults to http.sandbox=true, so commands received through /cmd temporarily enable cfg.sandbox. However, cfg.sandbox.grain defaults to all, which means all sandbox capabilities - including exec - remain allowed. Therefore enabling the HTTP sandbox alone does NOT prevent commands from spawning processes. This only matters when the HTTP command endpoint is reachable by someone you do not trust. It is not a remote vulnerability by default: the HTTP server must first be started and exposed to the attacker."
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