---
id: "CVE-2026-111997"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-111997", "GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5"]
title: "ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.3
epss: 0.002529999939724803
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "ip-address", "fixed": ["10.7.4"], "affected": "<= 10.7.3", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["cwe-1333", "ip-address", "node.js", "npm", "package", "request-body-parsing", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["does-not-use-address6", "fixed-version-10.7.4-or-later", "header-only-input", "static-input-only"]
published_at: "2026-10-18T01:16:35+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T19:11:31+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:14+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T19:11:31+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111997", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:14+00:00"}]
---

# ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process

The ip-address npm package's Address6 parser strips IPv6 zone identifiers with a regex whose cost grows quadratically when the input has many % characters followed by a line terminator. A single long string passed to new Address6(), isValid() or related methods blocks the Node.js event loop for seconds at 100 KB.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- npm:ip-address affected <= 10.7.3 fixed 10.7.4

## How to check

Run npm ls ip-address to list installed versions; affected is 10.7.3 and earlier (and the 5.x and 9.x lines shown with the same timings).
Search code for Address6, isValid, fromAddressAndMask, fromAddressAndWildcardMask, fromAddress4Nat64 or toAddress4Nat64 receiving untrusted input.

## Fix

Upgrade ip-address to 10.7.4 or later.
If upgrade is not possible, reject candidate host strings longer than 64 characters before calling Address6 (per the advisory's workaround).

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T19:11:31+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5
- 2026-10-23T21:57:14+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111997

## From the sources

### Summary

`new Address6()` and `Address6.isValid()` strip a zone identifier with the pattern `/%.*$/` before they apply the 45-character length limit. When the string holds many `%` characters followed by a line terminator, the pattern is retried from every `%` and each attempt scans to the line terminator before failing, so rejecting the string takes time proportional to the square of its length. 10,000 `%` characters and a newline take 41 ms, 40,000 take 632 ms and 100,000 take 3.9 s of synchronous work. The same strings without the newline are rejected in under a millisecond.

An application that validates an attacker-supplied string with these methods can be stalled by a single long request. The input is rejected with the correct `AddressError`; the cost of reaching that rejection is the defect.

### Details

The constructor in `src/ipv6.ts` removes the CIDR suffix, then the zone, then checks the length of what is left:

```ts
const zone = constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING.exec(address);

if (zone) {
  this.zone = zone[0];

  address = address.replace(constants6.RE_ZONE_STRING, '');
}

const longest = this.groups * 5 + 5;

if (address.length > longest) {
  throw new AddressError(`IPv6 addresses are at most ${longest} characters.`);
}
```

`RE_ZONE_STRING` is `/%.*$/`. It has no anchor at its start, `.` does not match a line terminator (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028 or U+2029), and without the `m` flag `$` matches only at the end of the input. For `%` repeated N times and then `\n`, the engine starts a match at the first `%`, `.*` consumes the remaining `%` characters up to the newline, `$` fails there, and backtracking through every shorter `.*` fails too. The engine then starts again at the second `%`, and so on: N starts, each proportional to N. The length limit that follows rejects the string in constant time, after the scan has already run.

The line terminator need not be last. Any string in which many `%` characters precede a line terminator behaves the same way.

Every entry point that passes a caller's string to the `Address6` constructor is affected: `new Address6()`, `isValid()`, both arguments of `fromAddressAndMask()` and `fromAddressAndWildcardMask()`, and the prefix argument of `fromAddress4Nat64()` and `toAddress4Nat64()`. `fromWildcard()` rejects a `%` before it constructs anything, `fromURL()` admits only hex digits, colons and dots in a host, and `fromArpa()` checks the nibble grammar first, so those three are unaffected. `Address4` has no zone and is unaffected.

### Affected versions

`<= 10.7.3`. The zone pattern has been in the constructor since 1.0.0; 5.9.4, 9.0.5 and 10.7.0 show the same timings as 10.7.3.

### Impact

`Address6.isValid()` on N `%` characters and a newline, measured on ip-address 10.7.3 and node 24.21.0:

| Input | Wall time | Same length of `!` |
|---|---|---|
| 5,461 characters | 13 ms | 0.1 ms |
| 16 KiB | 108 ms | 0.1 ms |
| 100 KB | 3.9 s | 0.1 ms |
| 256 KiB | 27 s | 0.2 ms |

The parse is synchronous, so the event loop is blocked for the whole of the wall time and nothing else on that process is served. No memory is retained and the process resumes when the call returns.

### Reachability

The input needs a line terminator after the `%` characters, which decides where it can arrive. An HTTP header value cannot carry a carriage return or a line feed, so a host or address taken from a header does not reach this. A URL can carry both characters percent-encoded at three bytes each, and Node's default 16 KB limit on the request line and headers admits about 5,461 of them: 13 ms. A request body is where the larger sizes come from. Common body parsers default to between 100 KB and 1 MB, and at 100 KB one field passed to the parser unchecked blocks the process for 3.9 s.

### Proof of concept

`npm i ip-address@10.7.3`, then:

```js
const { Address6 } = require('ip-address');

function time(input) {
  const start = process.hrtime.bigint();

  Address6.isValid(input);

  return `${(Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - start) / 1e6).toFixed(1)} ms`;
}

for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 100000]) {
  console.log(`${n}: ${time(`${'%'.repeat(n)}\n`)}, without the newline ${time('%'.repeat(n))}`);
}
```

On affected versions (node 24.21.0):

```
10000: 41.0 ms, without the newline 0.0 ms
20000: 161.1 ms, without the newline 0.0 ms
40000: 632.4 ms, without the newline 0.1 ms
100000: 3899.8 ms, without the newline 0.1 ms
```

Each doubling of the input multiplies the time by four.

### Remediation

Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, the constructor finds the zone by the index of the first `%` and accepts the remainder as a zone only when it holds no line terminator, which reads the input once. 1 MiB of the input above is rejected in about a millisecond. Every address that parsed before parses to the same result, and a string with a line terminator after a `%` is rejected as it was.

`RE_ZONE_STRING` stays exported from `v6/constants` for code that imports it directly and is marked `@deprecated`; the library itself does not call it.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, reject a candidate longer than an address with a zone identifier can be before you parse it:

```js
if (host.length > 64) throw new Error('not an IP address');
```

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_