Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-111763
Go to dashboardThe A2A Java SDK sends the client's API key under a header name chosen by the remote agent's AgentCard, so a malicious agent can pick a custom header. A redirect from that agent then forwards the key to a third-party server.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 3h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product |
|---|
| Ecosystem |
|---|
| Affected |
|---|
| Fixed in |
|---|
| org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-parent | maven | < 1.3.0.Final | 1.3.0.Final |
Check whether the pom.xml or lockfile pulls org.a2aproject.sdk:a2a-java-sdk-parent (or a2a-java-sdk modules) below 1.3.0.Final.
1.3.0.Final or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Impact.* A malicious or compromised A2A agent can cause the client's API key credential to be forwarded to an arbitrary third-party server. The agent serves an AgentCard with an APIKeySecurityScheme specifying a custom header name, then responds with an HTTP redirect. The JDK HttpClient follows the redirect and forwards the custom header containing the credential, since only the standard Authorization header may be stripped on cross-origin redirects.
Where. client/transport/spi/src/main/java/org/a2aproject/sdk/client/transport/spi/interceptors/auth/AuthInterceptor.java:69 in intercept
What. The apiKeySecurityScheme.name() field from the remote agent's AgentCard (untrusted, server-controlled data) is used directly as the HTTP header name when placing client credentials. Combined with JdkA2AHttpClient's followRedirects(NORMAL) policy, credentials under custom header names survive cross-origin redirects (only Authorization is stripped on newer JDKs), allowing a malicious agent to leak client credentials to third-party servers. Additionally, AuthInterceptor does not check that location==HEADER before placing the credential as a header.
Exploit scenario. Client configures an API key credential for agent's security scheme myAuth. The malicious agent returns an AgentCard where securitySchemes includes myAuth as APIKeySecurityScheme with name='X-Leaked-Cred' and location=HEADER. AuthInterceptor places the credential in the X-Leaked-Cred header. The agent responds with HTTP 302 redirect to https://evil.com/collect. JdkA2AHttpClient follows the redirect, forwarding all custom headers including X-Leaked-Cred to evil.com. The attacker captures the client's credential.
Preconditions.
CredentialService for the agent's security schemeJdkA2AHttpClient is used (with followRedirects=NORMAL)Fix. Validate the APIKeySecurityScheme.name() field against a whitelist of safe header names. Check that apiKeySecurityScheme.location() equals Location.HEADER before placing the credential as a header. Consider using followRedirects(NEVER) and implementing manual redirect handling that strips all authentication headers on cross-origin redirects.
Verification. 2/3 lens verifiers confirmed.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-111763")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.