Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-111114
Go to dashboardThe Nexter Extension WordPress plugin, through version 4.7.11, lets a logged-in user restore a stale Administrator role on their own account. The stale role is left behind when an admin is demoted through the bulk role-change screen instead of the user edit screen.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Sites running the Nexter Extension plugin at version 4.7.11 or earlier are exposed. The attack needs an account that was once an Administrator, used the View Admin Role Switcher, and was then demoted through the bulk role-change control. Sites that never used that feature or never demoted an admin in bulk are much less exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
wp plugin list or the WordPress Plugins screen; versions up to and including 4.7.11 are affected.nxtext_view_admin_original_role is set to administrator on accounts that are now lower roles, for example with wp user meta list <user-id>.4.7.11; the sources do not name the fixed version.nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta from accounts that are no longer administrators, for example with wp user meta delete <user-id> nxtext_view_admin_original_role.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.7.11 The vulnerability exists because the /?reset-view handler in role_switcher_to_view_admin_as() performs no nonce or capability check when the supplied username matches the authenticated caller, and because the plugin's only cleanup mechanism — the profile_update hook — does not fire when WordPress performs a bulk role change via wp-admin/users.php?action=promote, which calls WP_User::set_role() directly and leaves a stale administrator value in the nxtext_view_admin_original_role user meta. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access or above to restore the stale stored Administrator role to their own account, effectively escalating their privileges to Administrator. Exploitation requires that the attacker's account previously held the Administrator role and used the View Admin Role Switcher feature before being demoted specifically through the bulk role-change control rather than the Edit User screen, as only the bulk path bypasses the profile_update hook that would otherwise have cleared the stored original role.
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