Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-110975
Go to dashboardKruize Autotune's REST API has no authentication layer, and its datasource endpoints serialize stored secrets such as basic-auth passwords, bearer tokens, API keys and OAuth2 client secrets. Any client that can reach the service can read these credentials and reuse them against the backing monitoring stack.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams running Kruize Autotune that have configured monitoring datasources with authentication secrets are exposed, because the endpoints return those secrets. Exposure depends on whether the REST API is reachable by untrusted clients; deployments limited to a private network with no outside access carry lower risk. Installations that store no datasource credentials have nothing to leak from these endpoints.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
GET /datasources from a host without credentials and see whether datasource auth fields are returned.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
A flaw was found in Kruize Autotune. Its REST API ships without an authentication layer, and the endpoints that return datasource configuration — the list-datasources endpoint (GET /datasources) and the datasource-metadata endpoint — serialized datasource objects using a default Gson configuration with no field-exclusion strategy. As a result, the authentication secrets stored for each configured monitoring datasource (basic-auth passwords, bearer tokens, API keys, and OAuth2 client secrets) were returned in cleartext to any client able to reach the service. An attacker with network access to Autotune could harvest these credentials and reuse them to authenticate to the backing monitoring stack.
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