OPEN-WEBUI · CVE-2026-109283 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 0.11.4
When Open WebUI's OAuth token exchange is enabled with role management, a user whose identity provider role was changed to a disallowed one can still get a working session if roles appear only in the ID token. The attacker keeps the role they held before, and gains nothing beyond their previous access.
first public Sep 27, 2026 · 2 sources
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Only deployments that turn on OAuth token exchange and OAuth role management, with an identity provider that puts roles only in the ID token, are exposed. An attacker must already have a linked account and an active provider login whose role has since been removed from the allowed list. Deployments with either setting off, or whose provider returns roles in userinfo, are not affected.
Not affected if browser-login-only, default-config, provider-returns-roles-in-userinfo
Who cares entra-id, oauth, open-webui, python, self-hosted
ENABLE_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE and ENABLE_OAUTH_ROLE_MANAGEMENT are both set to true.OAUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES is set and does not contain *.pip show open-webui; affected builds are .The OAuth token exchange endpoint lets a user who already has a linked OAuth account swap a provider access token for an Open WebUI session. Since 0.11.1 it applies the OAuth role policy, but it only reads roles from the provider's userinfo response, and it only refuses a user when a roles claim is found. With an identity provider that sends roles only in the ID token (Microsoft Entra ID app roles are the common case), token exchange sees no roles and keeps the user's existing role, so a user whose provider role no longer satisfies the policy, and who is correctly refused at browser login, can still get a working session.
ENABLE_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE=true (default false).ENABLE_OAUTH_ROLE_MANAGEMENT=true (default false), with OAUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES (default user,admin) not containing *.Check it with your coding agent
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>= 0.11.1, < 0.11.4Upgrade to 0.11.4
open-webui (pypi): move to 0.11.4.Deployments with either setting off, or whose provider returns roles in userinfo, are not affected.
A user the operator meant to lock out through the OAuth role policy keeps signing in through token exchange and keeps the role they held before, together with everything that role can reach. The attacker gains nothing beyond their previous access: an empty roles claim can neither grant admin nor change the role. Exploitation needs the non-default configuration above and a previously provisioned account. Browser SSO login is not affected and refuses the user as intended.
Fixed in 10d1cfe63, released in 0.11.4. Token exchange now also reads the roles claim from the exchanged token, and when role management is on and no roles claim can be read at all, it refuses the exchange.
POST /api/v1/auths/oauth/{provider}/token/exchange) and the OAuth role policy it calls.The role policy was written for browser login, where the ID token claims are merged into the user data before the policy runs, so "no roles claim" there means the provider genuinely sent none and keeping the current role is the documented behaviour. Token exchange never receives an ID token and builds the user data from userinfo alone, so for providers that only put roles in the ID token the policy always saw an empty claim and fell through to keeping the existing role instead of refusing.
Reproduced on the 0.11.3 and 0.11.4 PyPI packages with a local OIDC provider that puts roles only in the ID token, ENABLE_OAUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE=true, ENABLE_OAUTH_ROLE_MANAGEMENT=true and an OAUTH_ALLOWED_ROLES list.
POST /api/v1/auths/oauth/{provider}/token/exchange with {"token": "<access token>"}.GET /api/v1/auths/. On 0.11.4 it returns 403.Control: a user still holding an allowed role is allowed on both versions.
manus-pi: reported the role policy bypass on token exchange for providers that send roles only in the ID token.This page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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