{"id":"CVE-2026-105810","kind":"vulnerability","aliases":["CVE-2026-105810"],"related":[],"title":"Tapo C320WS camera: authenticated overflow in Wi-Fi onboarding gives root code execution","description":"Tapo C320WS\nV2.0 contains an authenticated stack-based buffer overflow in the local\nonboarding Wi-Fi configuration path. An authenticated attacker on the\nadjacent network can submit a crafted request containing an oversized encrypted\npassword field, overwrite stack state, and execute commands with root\nprivileges.\n\n\n\n\n\nSuccessful\nexploitation may allow an authenticated adjacent-network attacker to take\ncontrol of the affected camera, modify camera behavior, access sensitive local\nconfiguration, and disrupt device availability.","summary":"The Tapo C320WS V2.0 camera has a stack-based buffer overflow in its local onboarding Wi-Fi configuration path. An attacker with credentials on the adjacent network can send an oversized encrypted password field and run commands as root on the camera.","severity":"high","cvss":8.5,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["home-security-camera","infrastructure","iot","tapo-c320ws"],"not_affected_if":["no-tapo-camera","other-tapo-models"],"how_to_check":"- Check the camera model and hardware version in the Tapo app or on the device label: unknown whether the sources list a firmware version range.\n- Check for the Tapo C320WS V2.0 model on the network; unknown whether the sources give a detection command.","fix":"- Update the Tapo C320WS V2.0 firmware to the latest version from TP-Link: unknown whether the sources name a fixed version.\n- Restrict the camera's local network access until a fix is applied: unknown whether the sources name a specific setting.","status":"open","published_at":"2026-10-19T18:16:58+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-23T21:57:18+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-10-25T03:00:30+00:00","updated_at":"2026-10-25T03:00:30+00:00","category":"infrastructure","confidence":0.6,"triage":{"at":"2026-10-25T03:00:30Z","model":"claude-haiku-5-5","output":{"fix":"- Update the Tapo C320WS V2.0 firmware to the latest version from TP-Link: unknown whether the sources name a fixed version.\n- Restrict the camera's local network access until a fix is applied: unknown whether the sources name a specific setting.","reach":"network","title":"Tapo C320WS camera: authenticated overflow in Wi-Fi onboarding gives root code execution","impact":"high","summary":"The Tapo C320WS V2.0 camera has a stack-based buffer overflow in its local onboarding Wi-Fi configuration path. An attacker with credentials on the adjacent network can send an oversized encrypted password field and run commands as root on the camera.","category":"infrastructure","nicknames":[],"who_cares":["tapo-c320ws","iot","home-security-camera"],"confidence":0.6,"needs_auth":"yes","worst_case":"Attacker runs commands as root on the camera and takes control of it.","analyst_note":"Find the TP-Link advisory or firmware release that fixes CVE-2026-105810 for Tapo C320WS V2.0, and confirm the affected firmware range.","how_to_check":"- Check the camera model and hardware version in the Tapo app or on the device label: unknown whether the sources list a firmware version range.\n- Check for the Tapo C320WS V2.0 model on the network; unknown whether the sources give a detection command.","needs_analyst":true,"not_affected_if":["other-tapo-models","no-tapo-camera"],"who_is_affected":"Owners of the Tapo C320WS V2.0 camera on a local network where an untrusted party could reach the device. The sources describe exposure through the local onboarding Wi-Fi configuration path, so the risk is local-network, not internet-facing. Teams with other Tapo models or no Tapo cameras can skip it.","user_interaction":"no","needs_special_setup":"unknown","severity_if_unknown":"high"},"cost_usd":0.000671,"input_tokens":3401,"output_tokens":662,"severity_before":"high"},"analyst_status":null,"analyst_note":null,"search":"'-105810':17A,20A '-2026':16A,19A 'access':141C 'adjac':57B,99C,128C 'adjacent-network':127C 'affect':136C 'allow':124C 'attack':52B,96C,130C 'authent':4A,79C,95C,126C 'avail':148C 'base':39B,82C 'behavior':140C 'buffer':40B,83C 'c320ws':2A,29B,32B,75C 'camera':3A,24B,34B,73B,137C,139C 'code':13A 'command':68B,117C 'configur':49B,92C,144C 'contain':77C,106C 'control':133C 'craft':104C 'credenti':54B 'cve':15A,18A 'devic':147C 'disrupt':146C 'encrypt':63B,109C 'execut':14A,116C 'exploit':122C 'fi':9A,48B,91C 'field':65B,111C 'give':11A 'home':22B 'home-security-camera':21B 'infrastructur':25B 'iot':26B 'local':44B,87C,143C 'may':123C 'modifi':138C 'network':58B,100C,129C 'onboard':10A,45B,88C 'overflow':5A,41B,84C 'overs':62B,108C 'overwrit':112C 'password':64B,110C 'path':50B,93C 'privileg':120C 'request':105C 'root':12A,70B,119C 'run':67B 'secur':23B 'send':60B 'sensit':142C 'stack':38B,81C,113C 'stack-bas':37B,80C 'state':114C 'submit':102C 'success':121C 'take':132C 'tapo':1A,28B,31B,74C 'tapo-c320ws':27B 'v2.0':33B,76C 'wi':8A,47B,90C 'wi-fi':7A,46B,89C","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":"Owners of the Tapo C320WS V2.0 camera on a local network where an untrusted party could reach the device. The sources describe exposure through the local onboarding Wi-Fi configuration path, so the risk is local-network, not internet-facing. Teams with other Tapo models or no Tapo cameras can skip it.","tier":"B","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-10-19T18:16:58+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","cvss_by":"f23511db-6c3e-4e32-a477-6aa17d310630","poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"nvd","external_id":"CVE-2026-105810","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105810","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-10-19T18:16:58+00:00","modified_at":"2026-10-20T20:17:12+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-10-23T21:57:18+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-10-23T22:28:57+00:00","note":null}],"documents":[],"notice":"Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai"}