---
id: "CVE-2026-104768"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-104768"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-104768"]
title: "AutomatorWP WordPress plugin: comment approval lets attackers create administrator accounts"
severity: "high"
cvss: 7.5
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "automatorwp", "fixed": ["6.0.5"], "affected": "<= 6.0.4", "ecosystem": "wordpress"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["automatorwp", "package", "privilege-escalation", "wordpress", "wordpress-plugins"]
not_affected_if: ["fixed-role-option", "no-anonymous-automation", "plugin-not-installed"]
published_at: "2026-11-07T12:17:41+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-07T12:47:08+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-07T12:53:36+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104768", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-07T12:47:08+00:00"}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/automatorwp/automatorwp-604-unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-to-insufficient-role-validation-in-anonymous-automation-role-option", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-07T12:53:36+00:00", "cites": ["https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/automatorwp/automatorwp-604-unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-to-insufficient-role-validation-in-anonymous-automation-role-option", "https://wordpress.org/plugins/automatorwp/"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# AutomatorWP WordPress plugin: comment approval lets attackers create administrator accounts

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-104768 (this .md is for agents)

The AutomatorWP WordPress plugin, up to and including 6.0.4, does not check that a role assigned by an automation is at or below the privilege of the acting context. An unauthenticated attacker can post a comment that makes an admin approval create a new administrator account tied to an email they control, giving full control of the site.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- wordpress:automatorwp affected <= 6.0.4 fixed 6.0.5

## How to check

- WordPress admin > Plugins: AutomatorWP version 6.0.4 or lower is affected; 6.0.5+ has the role-assignment hardening.
- Look for automations with an anonymous user (or Create User / Add-Change Role) action whose Role option uses a dynamic tag such as {comment_author}; if none, the issue is not reachable.
- Until updated, remove such automations or set the Role to a fixed low-privilege role, and review Users for unexpected administrators.

## Fix

Update AutomatorWP to 6.0.5 or later (changelog: 'Security improvements to role assignment across all actions that can modify user roles').

## Timeline

- 2026-11-07T12:47:08+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104768
- 2026-11-07T12:53:36+00:00 analyst https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/automatorwp/automatorwp-604-unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-to-insufficient-role-validation-in-anonymous-automation-role-option — Fixed in 6.0.5 inferred from the plugin changelog on wordpress.org (release after 6.0.4, role-assignment hardening); changelog does not cite the CVE, so fix not marked verified. Wordfence is the advisory. Exploit needs an admin to approve a comment plus a specific automation config. No exploitation or PoC seen.

## Documents

- [advisory] Wordfence: AutomatorWP <= 6.0.4 privilege escalation https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/automatorwp/automatorwp-604-unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-to-insufficient-role-validation-in-anonymous-automation-role-option
- [fix] AutomatorWP plugin page and changelog (wordpress.org) https://wordpress.org/plugins/automatorwp/

## From the sources

The AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 6.0.4. This is due to missing privilege-ceiling validation in the `create_user()` function within the anonymous-user action (and equally in the Create User and Add/Change Role WordPress-integration actions), which verify only that the submitted role exists via `automatorwp_get_editable_roles()` without confirming the role falls at or below the acting context's privilege level — allowing attacker-controlled trigger tag data (e.g., a `{comment_author}` tag bound to the Role option) to supply any role, including `administrator`, unchallenged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create a new administrator-role account tied to an attacker-controlled email address, receiving the generated password via WordPress's new-user notification email and thereby gaining full administrative access to the site. Exploitation requires the site to have an anonymous automation configured with the Role option bound to a dynamic trigger tag such as `{comment_author}`, and is triggered when a site administrator performs the routine action of approving a comment — an action that provides no in-UI indication that it will mint a new privileged account from the comment author field.

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