Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-104181
Go to dashboardFilament's app-based MFA management actions (setup, disable, regenerate recovery codes) did not require the current password, so anyone with a logged-in session could change a user's MFA configuration. An attacker with a hijacked session could enroll their own MFA app, take recovery codes, or lock the real user out, but cannot sign in on their own.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 5h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| filament/filament | composer | >= 4.0.0, <= 4.13.2 | 4.13.3 |
| filament/filament | composer | >= 5.0.0, <= 5.8.2 | 5.8.3 |
composer show filament/filament and check whether the version is in 4.0.0 to 4.13.2 or 5.0.0 to 5.8.2Upgrade filament/filament to 4.13.3 (4.x line) or 5.8.3 (5.x line).
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
App-based multi-factor authentication management actions did not consistently require the user to confirm their current password. In particular, an authenticated session could set up app-based MFA and obtain recovery codes without password reauthentication. Disabling app-based MFA and regenerating recovery codes also accepted an existing app code or recovery code without requiring the current password. This issue does not affect email-based MFA.
If an attacker gains access to a user's authenticated session, they could enable app-based MFA and obtain recovery codes without knowing the user's password, changing the account's MFA configuration and potentially locking the legitimate user out. This issue does not by itself allow an unauthenticated attacker to sign in.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-104181")
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