Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-101274
Go to dashboardpretix acting as an SSO identity provider did not check the requested response_type against the client's configured grant type. A client set up for code-only flow can be tricked into receiving an id_token instead, which the attacker can use without the client secret.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-28 11:32 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Only sites running pretix as the identity provider for customer-account single sign-on, where an SSO client is configured with a redirect_uri list. Exploitation also requires the attacker to run JavaScript on a page at one of those allowed redirect_uri targets. Sites that do not use pretix as an SSO identity provider are not exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
pip show pretixcode response typeEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
When pretix is used as the identity provider in a Single-Sign-On (SSO) setup for customer accounts, the system did not properly validate the response_type requested in an authorization request against the configured grant type of the SSO client. This means that if an SSO client was configured to only allow the code response type, which requires knowledge of the client secret to use and would wrongfully send a response type like id_token, it would receive back a valid token. Exploiting this requires the attacker to run JavaScript on the page specified by redirect_uri, which must be from a list specified in the client configuration.
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