Live › vulnerability › CVE-2024-32874
Go to dashboardFrigate passes user-supplied filenames to Werkzeug's secure_filename(), which runs costly Unicode NFKD normalization with no length limit. A very long Unicode filename makes the server spend heavy CPU, causing application-level denial of service.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-27 16:41 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Frigate instances below 0.13.2 are affected. Exploitation requires access to the Frigate instance; the advisory notes that a working authentication layer in front of Frigate blocks exploitation unless that layer is bypassed. Teams running Frigate on a private network behind authentication face lower practical risk but should still upgrade.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| frigate | pypi | < 0.13.2 | 0.13.2 |
< 0.13.2pip show frigate or inspect the container image tag to confirm the version0.13.2 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Important: Exploiting this vulnerability requires the attacker to have access to your Frigate instance, which means they could also just delete all of your recordings or perform any other action. If you have configured authentication in front of Frigate via a reverse proxy, then this vulnerability is not exploitable without first getting around your authentication method. For many obvious reasons in addition to this one, please don't expose your Frigate instance publicly without any kind of authentication.
When uploading a file or retrieving the filename, a user may intentionally use a large Unicode filename which would lead to a application-level denial of service. This is due to no limitation set on the length of the filename and the costy use of the Unicode normalization with the form NFKD under the hood of secure_filename().
I idenfied multiple vulnerable paths on blakeblackshear/frigate repository. In all of those paths, it was possible for a malicious user to send a filename equals to the output of : python3 -c "print('℀' * 1_000_000)" which would reach the werkzeug secure_filename() call , which in turn under the hood uses a compatibility Unicode normalization with NFKC/NFKD form. In sum, the latter call would be costly in matter of CPU resource and may lead to the application-level denial of service.
This user-provided value can reach a costly Unicode normalization operation.
This user-provided value can reach a costly Unicode normalization operation.
This user-provided value can reach a costly Unicode normalization operation.
[frigate/api/media.py](https://github.com/blakeblackshe
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