Live › vulnerability › CVE-2024-32651
Go to dashboardchangedetection.io renders notification title and body fields through Jinja2 as templates, so a crafted value in a watch's Notifications tab executes Python on the server. An attacker who can edit a watch gets remote command execution on the host, with no reading of output needed since a reverse shell works.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-27 16:25 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Any deployment of changedetection.io at or below 0.45.20 where someone can create or edit a watch, which is the default for the web UI. Exposure is highest when the UI is reachable without a password, since the advisory notes login is not enforced by default. Teams running only a patched release or an instance locked to trusted users behind login can deprioritise it.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| changedetection.io | pypi | <= 0.45.20 | 0.45.21 |
pip show changedetection.io or docker images dgtlmoon/changedetection.io; affected versions are <= 0.45.20changedetection.io to 0.45.21 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
A Server Side Template Injection in changedetection.io caused by usage of unsafe functions of Jinja2 allows Remote Command Execution on the server host.
changedetection.io version: 0.45.20
docker images
REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE
dgtlmoon/changedetection.io latest 53529c2e69f1 44 hours ago 423MB
The vulnerability is caused by the usage of vulnerable functions of Jinja2 template engine.
from jinja2 import Environment, BaseLoader
...
# Get the notification body from datastore
jinja2_env = Environment(loader=BaseLoader)
n_body = jinja2_env.from_string(n_object.get('notification_body', '')).render(**notification_parameters)
n_title = jinja2_env.from_string(n_object.get('notification_title', '')).render(**notification_parameters)
{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__('os').popen('id').read() }}
In the PoC I've used id as payload and Telegram to read the result.
Attackers can run any system command without any restriction and they don't need to read the result in the notification app (e.g. they could use a reverse shell).
The impact is critical as the attacker can completely takeover the server host.
This can be reduced if changedetection access is protected by login page with a password, but this isn't required by the application (not by default and not enforced).
Edoardo Ottavianelli
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2024-32651")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.