---
id: "CMP-202611-pvd2yi"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-pvd2yi"
kind: "campaign"
aliases: []
title: "Dosu breached through one missing Row Level Security check: attacker took owner of its internal org, then CI previews leaked production cloud credentials"
severity: "high"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "vendor"
products: [{"name": "Dosu", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Dosu"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ai-keys", "breach", "campaign", "ci", "row-level-security", "supabase"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-11-08T00:00:00+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-15T20:29:04+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-15T20:31:02+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "analyst", "url": "https://dosu.dev/security/incident-2026-11-02", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-15T20:29:04+00:00", "cites": ["https://dosu.dev/security/incident-2026-11-02"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Dosu breached through one missing Row Level Security check: attacker took owner of its internal org, then CI previews leaked production cloud credentials

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-pvd2yi (this .md is for agents)

On Nov 2, 2026 an attacker signed up for a free Dosu account and used an incorrect row-level security check on org invitations to make themselves owner of Dosu's internal org. They pointed its integrations at their own server to capture credentials (a read-only database token and a GitHub bot token), read database tables for about an hour, and opened a pull request whose CI infrastructure preview sent production cloud credentials to them. They appeared to be hunting OpenAI and Anthropic API keys. Dosu's database provider, Supabase, detected the activity and alerted Dosu. User names, emails and sign-in providers were exposed; integration credentials were encrypted and API keys hashed. Dosu rotated all production secrets the same day.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- :Dosu affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Cause

How the attacker got in: a previously unknown vulnerability (a zero-day) (zero-day). The attacker signed up for a free account and used an incorrect row-level security check on org invitations to become owner of Dosu's internal org, a flaw in the victim's own platform with no mention of a prior advisory or fix, and the incident stayed within Dosu's systems and data.

How it reached others: it stayed inside (none).

So it does not happen to you: A zero-day has no patch to wait for: limit what one compromised part can reach (isolated builds and workers, short-lived scoped credentials, secrets the build path cannot decrypt) and alert on calls a service never makes.

Last month's incidents with the same cause, and the full checklist: https://infrastack.ai/live/breaches.md#zero-day

## How to check

If you use Dosu, search your logs for the indicators in Dosu's post-mortem. For your own app: test every RLS policy on invitation and membership tables with a non-member account, and check whether any CI job that runs on pull requests can reach production credentials.

## Fix

Scope RLS policies on invitations and memberships to existing owners; never give pull-request CI jobs production credentials; use short-lived deploy credentials.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-15T20:29:04+00:00 analyst https://dosu.dev/security/incident-2026-11-02

## Documents

- [describes] Dosu: Nov 2, 2026 Security Incident Post-Mortem https://dosu.dev/security/incident-2026-11-02

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
