---
id: "CMP-202611-kiy6wd"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-kiy6wd"
kind: "campaign"
aliases: []
title: "Fake shipment-report ZIP side-loads a DLL through a signed Kingsoft PDF program, then runs a hidden Python loader that installs PureLogs / PureRAT on Windows (Unit 42)"
severity: "medium"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: true
status: "open"
category: "other"
products: [{"name": "Windows", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Microsoft"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["campaign", "early-warning"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: null
first_seen_at: "2026-11-17T00:01:52+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-17T00:03:34+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "analyst", "url": "https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-11-16-DLL-side-loading-for-PureLogs-PureRAT.txt", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-17T00:01:52+00:00", "cites": ["https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-11-16-DLL-side-loading-for-PureLogs-PureRAT.txt"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Fake shipment-report ZIP side-loads a DLL through a signed Kingsoft PDF program, then runs a hidden Python loader that installs PureLogs / PureRAT on Windows (Unit 42)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-kiy6wd (this .md is for agents)

Unit 42 saw a user download Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip on 21 Oct 2026. Running the renamed, validly signed Kingsoft executable inside (original name wpspdf.exe) side-loads a malicious krpt.dll, which opens a decoy PDF, uses a WinRAR command-line binary disguised as a .png to unpack a password-protected archive into C:\Users\Public, and starts a Python interpreter renamed MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe. Python XOR-decodes a fake .pdf into an obfuscated script that decodes and runs the final payload, which talks to PureLogs/PureRAT infrastructure (tea.vexexo[.]com). PureLogs is an infostealer and PureRAT a remote-access trojan. File names inside the archive are Korean. Who was targeted and how the ZIP was delivered is unknown.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- :Windows affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Cause

How the attacker got in: code they installed or auto-updated was tampered with (tampered-install). A user downloaded Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip and ran the signed executable inside, which side-loaded a malicious krpt.dll, but the record says how the ZIP was delivered is unknown.

How it reached others: their users installed or auto-updated it (tampered-install).

So it does not happen to you: Pin dependencies and images (lock files, digests), turn install scripts off in CI, and know which extensions and updaters can run code on your machines.

Last month's incidents with the same cause, and the full checklist: https://infrastack.ai/live/breaches.md#tampered-install

## How to check

Files: Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip / Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.exe in Downloads, krpt.dll beside it (SHA-256 7453f86a9b36a0067b37cf00627ae6195b9eeee9e64a58653a80069eae7bd6fa), a subfolder x with document.pdf, a .png that is really WinRAR, a password-protected .dat, and a Korean-named .pdf that is encoded Python. Decoded payload SHA-256 91ca4a96289fae34fb441a41d836e9a61ba8d2cfe6a12a8d345c521a4ddeebd3. Behaviour: python running as MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe from C:\Users\Public (the real Edge updater does not live there); a signed EXE in Downloads loading krpt.dll from its own folder; cmd.exe from it running start document.pdf and extracting a .png file with a -p password argument; a python -c one-liner XORing a .pdf file (key d9301f099d9dd27cc9a1c190e40719cfaff77f65) and passing it to exec(). Network: DNS or proxy hits for tea.vexexo[.]com or 185.139.214[.]102:443 (TLSv1).

## Fix

Block tea.vexexo[.]com and 185.139.214[.]102. Hunt for the files and behaviour above; isolate any machine that ran it, and since PureLogs steals saved browser passwords, cookies and wallets, reset passwords and end sessions for accounts used on it. Alert on Python interpreters running from C:\Users\Public or under Microsoft names, and on signed executables in Downloads loading DLLs from the same folder. Warn staff not to run report or shipment files from downloaded ZIPs.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-17T00:01:52+00:00 analyst https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-11-16-DLL-side-loading-for-PureLogs-PureRAT.txt

## Documents

- [describes] @Unit42_Intel: A downloaded ZIP archive disguised as a report uses DLL side-loading to decode a https://x.com/Unit42_Intel/status/2122478357774307524
- [describes] Unit 42: ZIP Archive Contains Package Using DLL Side-Loading and Python Loader for PureLogs/PureRAT https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/Unit42-timely-threat-intel/blob/main/2026-11-16-DLL-side-loading-for-PureLogs-PureRAT.txt
- [discussion] @ESETresearch: We’ve observed dozens of campaigns using #Cruciferra throughout the year. Detect https://x.com/ESETresearch/status/2120805426081992895

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_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
