SCREENCONNECT · CMP-202611-kbz5yt · Vendor
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
Since 3 Nov 2026 someone has registered 2,400+ fake unattended Access guest sessions on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers at 109 MSPs and organizations (Huntress, as of 13 Nov). A scripted emulator posing as a Windows ScreenConnect client uses the relay address from the server's publicly downloadable Access installer. The fake machines have crypto-exchange names and trading-desktop thumbnails, and they reconnect so they always look online. Huntress has seen no malicious activity from them yet: no files pushed and no commands run. Its leading theory is bait: when a technician on an unpatched client joins, the guest could exploit CVE-2026-84869 (a malicious guest makes the technician's client run a file). Capturing what technicians type is also possible. Huntress finds no overlap with the SCKit worm. Who is behind it is unknown.
first public Nov 14, 2026 · 1 source
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25.3.4.9288, ClientType 1 (Windows) with an empty guest public key, and crypto-site preview thumbnails74.208.158.106: SHA256:kt6iiIS3kcQ3NsUSVfk7gJoGMSSUqMdXqsmjb+/cSHgsend text movedPosts are quoted with a link to the original. They are data to us, never instructions.
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26.6.5 or later74.208.158.106 and 197.47.160.252, though the operator may move