---
id: "CMP-202611-jugklh"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-jugklh"
kind: "campaign"
aliases: []
title: "SANSAR: attackers break into Linux GPU servers through exposed Ray job agents, mine crypto and fake NVIDIA readings so the GPUs look idle (Elastic)"
severity: "high"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: true
status: "open"
category: "infrastructure"
products: [{"name": "Ray", "note": "exposed job agent used for initial access", "fixed": [], "ecosystem": "pypi"}, {"name": "NVIDIA GPU drivers (NVML)", "note": "NVML library replaced by attacker wrapper", "fixed": [], "ecosystem": "linux"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ai-infrastructure", "campaign", "cryptomining", "early-warning", "gpu", "linux"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: null
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T09:55:44+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T09:57:15+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "analyst", "url": "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T09:55:44+00:00", "cites": ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# SANSAR: attackers break into Linux GPU servers through exposed Ray job agents, mine crypto and fake NVIDIA readings so the GPUs look idle (Elastic)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-jugklh (this .md is for agents)

Elastic Security Labs (REF3364, financially motivated, Turkish-language comments in code) saw an attacker in late October 2026 get in through an exposed Ray job agent, submit jobs running nvidia-smi and a Python reverse shell, add an SSH key to authorized_keys, get root and deploy the SANSAR toolkit on three Linux GPU hosts. SANSAR is a Rust orchestrator controlled over Tor that runs XMRig 6.25.0 (kurt) and SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 (tilki). A modified NVIDIA Management Library (NVML) wrapper makes nvidia-smi and other monitors show 0% GPU use with random 36-46 C temperature and 100-200 W power. A DKMS-built ftrace kernel rootkit (acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, reloaded from initramfs) hides processes, files and sockets, and a 'netns' systemd backdoor gets its C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract. Number of victims unknown.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- pypi:Ray affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- linux:NVIDIA GPU drivers (NVML) affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Cause

How the attacker got in: an internal system reachable from the internet (internal-exposed). Elastic reports the attacker got in through an exposed Ray job agent, a job submission API reachable from the internet without authentication, and the incident stayed on the victims' own GPU hosts.

How it reached others: it stayed inside (none).

So it does not happen to you: List internal apps with a public hostname and check none still accepts a development or default credential; make sure test environments cannot reach production.

Last month's incidents with the same cause, and the full checklist: https://infrastack.ai/live/breaches.md#internal-exposed

## How to check

Ray clusters whose job agent / dashboard (job submission API) is reachable from the internet or without authentication; Ray job logs showing nvidia-smi inventory jobs or Python reverse-shell jobs; files under /opt/vadi_ (e.g. /opt/vadi_/tilki); a kernel module acpi_thermal_mgr (DKMS entry, initramfs loader); a libnvidia-ml.so.1 that differs from the driver package's copy; a systemd service named netns; processes sansar, kurt, tilki, lyrebird or Tor traffic from GPU hosts; Tor C2 efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id[.]onion; queries to Ethereum contract 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349 followed by TCP to port 8080; GPU power draw or billing that does not match the near-0% use nvidia-smi shows; unknown keys in authorized_keys.

## Fix

Do not expose Ray's job submission/dashboard port to the internet; put it behind authentication and a network allowlist and limit who can submit jobs. On any host you suspect, do not trust nvidia-smi or ps: verify the NVML library against the driver package, check DKMS modules and the initramfs, and if the rootkit is found rebuild the host from a clean image (it survives reboot through initramfs). Remove unknown SSH keys and rotate credentials that were on the host.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T09:55:44+00:00 analyst https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware

## Documents

- [describes] @TheHackersNews: 🚨 Hackers are hijacking Linux GPUs—and making them appear idle.

New SANSAR cryp https://x.com/TheHackersNews/status/2122263542368006193
- [describes] SANSAR: Linux cryptomining toolkit hides GPU use with NVML wrapper and rootkit (REF3364) https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/sansar-linux-cryptomining-malware
- [discussion] @TheHackersNews: The attack goes deeper than GPU spoofing.

→ Initial access via exposed Ray job  https://x.com/TheHackersNews/status/2122270062992310393
- [discussion] @TheHackersNews: SANSAR doesn't just hide the miner.

It tampers with NVIDIA's NVML library so mo https://x.com/TheHackersNews/status/2122269958055071812

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
