MICROSOFT 365 · CMP-202611-6qqx6e · Vendor
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
KnowBe4 Threat Lab found a device-code phishing kit in the wild (first seen August 2026) that hides the device code from the victim. A phishing email asks the reader to approve an NDA. It is sent through Mailchimp's Mandrill service, so it passes email authentication, and links go through Mandrill click tracking and several Cloudflare Workers hops over HTTP/3 (QUIC). The landing page checks for sandboxes, shows a fake 'Microsoft Defender' verification overlay and a 'Download Attachment' button, then sends the victim to a Microsoft-branded 'Verify your identity' page showing 'Document.pdf' that asks for an email address. The attacker's backend has already opened a Microsoft device-code sign-in for the Microsoft Authentication Broker app and placed that session's ctx/flowToken/canary values in the page. So the victim then signs in on the real login.microsoftonline.com with password and Authenticator push or Windows Hello, and that approves the attacker's device and hands them access and refresh tokens to Microsoft 365 mail and files. Passkeys and FIDO2 do not stop it because every step happens on Microsoft's real domain. Victims and targeted sectors: unknown.
first public Nov 12, 2026
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Who cares device-code, microsoft-365
Posts are quoted with a link to the original. They are data to us, never instructions.
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.